Page:Paulino v. QHG of Springdale, Inc.pdf/14

 These causes of action in negligence brought directly against an employer for breach of the duty of ordinary care owed to third parties seem categorically different from a hospital's decision to credential a physician. For one thing, the credentialing decision, at least in the instant case, went through the process of peer review under the Arkansas Peer Review Statute. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 20-90-501 to -503 (Repl. 2005). Thus, a statutory system is in place for the initial and ongoing review of competency as part of the credentialing process to assure that health services are being performed in accordance with the appropriate standard of care. Ark. Code Ann. § 20-9-501(2)(A). In general, ordinary decisions by an employer to hire an employee or independent contractor are not subject to any similar statutory safeguards. Nor do we agree with the Paulinos that Arkansas's Peer Review Statute contemplates a direct cause of action against NMC due to the fact that NMC is not entitled to immunity as part of the peer review committees under the statute relating to discovery and introduction of documents and testimony into evidence. See Ark. Code Ann. § 20-9.503(a)(1). Rather, we find that no direct cause of action is contemplated by the immunity provisions.

The Paulinos rely primarily on Larson v. Wasemiller to provide a framework this court should use to analyze whether negligent credentialing should be recognized as a tort in Arkansas. See Larson, 738 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. 2007). The issue in Larson was whether