Page:Paulino v. QHG of Springdale, Inc.pdf/10

 (2) a doctor's treatment or order, or (3) a matter of medical science. Howard, 326 Ark. at 228, 930 S.W.2d at 343. Although the injury to Mrs. Paulino was the result of a doctor's treatment, this court has consistently rejected claims that an injury constituted a "medical injury" when the injury did not originate with a doctor's order. Compare Bailey, 307 Ark. 14, 817 S.W.2d 412, and Wyatt, 315 Ark. 547, 868 S.W.2d 505, with Sexton, 275 Ark. 361, 631 S.W.2d 270.

In the case at hand, the decision to credential Dr. Raben was not, at its genesis, a decision to pursue a method of treatment, care, or course of medical action relating to a specific patient. Because of this, we hold that the circuit court did not err in determining that the Medical Malpractice Act does not confer a cause of action for negligent credentialing as a "medical injury" due to the fact that credentialing decisions do not involve a professional service, doctor's treatment or order, or a matter of medical science related to specific patient care.

The fact that we conclude that the Medical Malpractice Act does not confer a cause of action for negligent credentialing, however, does not end the inquiry. The question remains whether Arkansas should recognize negligent credentialing as a new brand of negligence under its common law. In Bailey, this court held that no "medical injury" was involved in the case of the escaping patient, and, therefore, the heightened standard of care enunciated in the Medical Malpractice Act did not apply. Instead, this court observed that the proper standard of care was an ordinary-negligence standard. Bailey, 307 Ark. at 19, 817 S.W.2d at 414–15. Likewise, in Wyatt, this court found that breach of confidentiality was