Page:Paul Samuel Reinsch - Secret Diplomacy, How Far Can It Be Eliminated? - 1922.djvu/121



successful, and that Russia would not dare to fol- low up her constantly declared interest in the Servian situation. And if worst should come to worst, "well then," the German leaders seemed to think, "now will be better than later." No matter what reasonable occasion German states- men had during the years leading up to the war to fear a hostile policy on the part of neighboring governments, yet their attitude and action at a critical time shows uppermost in the minds of these statesmen and diplomats, a narrowly tac- tical, primarily bureaucratic, view of the factors involved. There was always present in the back- ground the notion of the necessity of a preventive war. Those who make the actual decision to be- gin a war without any immediate provocation making it plainly defensive, who begin it because of contingent dangers in the future, no matter how great, take a very serious responsibility. As has been said, the indicative "Germany made war," is far more apt to leave a powerful impres- sion in the record of history than the subjunc- tive, "If Germany had not made war then the others would have done so later on."

The fact that military action against Servia would probably involve Russia and thus set in motion the complete chain of international forces