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 53 Fifth, and relatedly, the appellant's submission is that even the shortest of the delays relied on, being three months, is unreasonable. It was submitted that the importance of timeliness is reflected in the fact that the applicant is required to be notified of the decision of their initial FOI request within 30 days: FOI Act's 15(5)(b). He submitted that where decisions are required to be made at first instance in 30 days, regardless of the complexity of the review process, at no point in the process should there be a delay of three times the original timeframe to undertake any one step in the review process.

54 In effect, the appellant characterised three months as the outer limit as a reasonable time in which to conduct an IC review. However, that approach is flawed. The relevant application being decided is an IC review application, not a decision of an applicant's initial FOI request.

55 By its nature, given the procedures set out in the FOI Act, as explained above, there are steps to be undertaken before the review can even take place (and steps not necessary in relation to the initial decision given that is made by the department holding the documents sought). For example, the reviewing body must obtain the material to conduct a merits review, which is always held by another department or agency. How quickly that is complied with depends on the type of material sought. The type of request dictates the procedure that must be followed (for example, exempt or conditionally exempt material, see [12] above). The steps to be undertaken, and by implication the complexity of the process, depends on the nature of the information sought under the FOI Act. Examples in this case include requests for extensions to the provision of information, or that the agency notified the applicant that it intended to reconsider the original decisions. This highlights that there is no one size fits all approach, such that it would be incorrect to approach the assessment of whether a delay is unreasonable in any application by considering any nominated time frame as an outer limit, let alone one of three months.

56 Sixth, there is a difference between the parties as to their characterisation of the right in question. The appellant contends that it is the right to access information in accordance with the FOI Act, and not simply the right to seek a review under s 55K. It was contended that it is incorrect to separate the review process from the underlying general right. On the other hand, the respondent submitted that the relevant right is the review application, because that is a particular step in the process which is not necessarily undertaken and has its own procedures. Patrick v Australian Information Commissioner [2024] FCAFC 93