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 Tribunal was confined to considering only that evidence that was in existence at that earlier time.

67 As in those cases, it is necessary in the present case to ask whether the defined phrase "official document of a Minister", as it appears in operative provisions, has the temporal element for which Mr Patrick contends. The text of the definition contained in s 4(1) (extracted at [21] above) is critical to that task, but it must be borne in mind that the words there are definitional. They have no operation other than in the specific contexts of the FOI Act in which the defined phrase is employed. They must be construed having regard to that specific context, as well as the wider context of the FOI Act and the general law. As Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ said in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362 (at [14]):

68 In Taylor v Owners – Strata Plan 11564 (2014) 253 CLR 531 Gageler and Keane JJ emphasised that the task of construction involves the attribution of legal meaning to statutory text, read in context. Their Honours continued:

Patrick v Attorney-General (Cth) [2024] FCA 268