Page:Papuan Campaign; The Buna-Sanananda Operation - Armed Forces in Action (1944).djvu/32

 enemy could not maintain a continuous or effective aerial offensive and suffered severe losses in his occasional raids. He never completely severed our fragile lines of communication.

Strategic bombing and strafing of enemy airfields at Lae, Salamaua, and Rabaul by the 5th Air Force was severely limited by the small number of planes available. Between 1 November 1942 and 31 January 1943, only 13½ tons of explosives were dropped on ground targets and shipping outside the coastal region of southeastern New Guinea. At the same time, however, the 13th Air Force was engaging large numbers of Japanese planes in the Solomons and was also bombing Rabaul. These attacks had an effect out of proportion to their apparent weight, for they compelled the enemy to allocate part of his strength to defense of his bases and restricted his ability to interfere with Allied operations in the Buna-Sanananda area.

Tactical bombing and strafing of enemy forward areas played a relatively small part, for such operations early proved almost as dangerous to our own troops as to the enemy. Contact between our ground units and those of the enemy was exceedingly close and aerial observation was practically impossible. Enemy rear areas were constantly pounded by our B–25's and A–20's, yet during the 6 weeks of active operations only 163 tons of bombs were dropped and 144,790 rounds of ammunition fired on the Buna Mission and Old Strip area. Bombardiers in the combat zone usually had to aim at jungle-covered ground targets visible only at extremely low altitudes. In most instances, pilots had to report "results unobserved." Nevertheless, these raids had telling effect on Japanese forward supply lines and Japanese morale.

Tactical aerial reconnaissance and observation were likewise very difficult, but proved invaluable to our ground forces. A flight of Australian Wirraways, based at Dobodura late in November, gathered information contributing to a precision in artillery fire otherwise impossible because of the inaccuracy of available maps.

Of first importance and most novel was the contribution of the 5th Air Force to the transport and supply of the ground troops. Most of our infantrymen and supporting troops, a total of 14,900 were flown to the Buna area in the uncomfortable bucket seats of C–47's. The 19