Page:Palmore v. State.pdf/19

266 Rh  their general conduct on the stand; and if they should believe that any of the witnesses have sworn falsely to any material fact in the case, they are at liberty to discard the whole statement of the witness so testifying." This is law.

10. "The jury are instructed that a reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt, because anything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jury in that condition that they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge." There can be no reasonable objection to this.

The appellant asked the court below to instruct the jury as set forth in ten distinct propositions. The court refused to give the 5th, 6th and 8th.

The 5th is as follows: "Words will not, in law, justify an assault; wherefore, if the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant did use provoking language to the deceased, upon which the deceased assaulted the defendant in a manner to produce a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the defendant that he was in danger of great bodily injury, and that such danger was impending, he is justified in employing such means for the defense of his person as he reasonably deems necessary, and if pressed, may kill the assailant."

This instruction was properly refused. It was too broad and unqualified. To excuse homicide, it must appear that the danger is not only impending, but so pressing and urgent as to render the killing necessary (Gantt's Dig., sec. 1285; McPherson v. State, ante, 225); and the circumstances must show that there was sufficient to arouse the fears of a reasonable person, and that the party killing really acted under their influence, and not in a spirit of revenge. Gantt's Dig., sec. 1284.