Page:Otto Wilhelm Kuusinen - The Finnish Revolution (1919).pdf/27

 which the Red Army suffered, namely, the lack of trained, capable and punctual officers who could inspire confidence. We had previously had no trained forces, since the country had been without an army for a sufficiently long period; only a few old non-commissioned officers were requisitioned by the workers. The most elementary military instruction for officers would certainly have been extremely useful, but it was not to be had, and we were without it throughout the whole course of the revolution.

To a most alarming extent it was sheer hazard which decided to whom such or such a post of command should he given. Sometimes these men were equal to the task before them, and made model troops of their men. But there were also in officers' corps and in the staffs a great number of unskilful, incompetent men, who, while not ne'er-do-wells, were nevertheless mere talkers who had never yet succeeded in any organising work or post of command, and who did not know how to set about things, although they had risen in the general confusion. If the well-tried organisers of the working-class movement had volunteered in greater numbers to lead the operations (as often was the case), the leadership of the class-war would certainly have improved on our side. The agitation undertaken in our ranks by the paid agents of the bourgeoisie against our military command would then have borne less fruit. An underground agitation of this kind is in a class-war the most dangerous and insidious weapon of the bourgeoisie, and the greater the number of elements with obscure antecedents who rise to the surface during a revolution, the more easily when reverses come do doubts arise about the honesty and incorruptibility of lenders.

The general leadership of the class struggle on our side also leaves much room for criticism. Lack of arms was the chief reason why a more energetic and continuous offensive was not undertaken at the outset. However, even when we had obtained arms, there was still the lack of drilled men. The weeks which had gone by had not been employed in energetically forming and drilling new troops, for no one had then expected a long class-war extending over several months. There was no regular specialist organisation. Our troops fought practically the whole time without reserves, a most fatiguing and dangerous thing. True, our front resisted the enemy's attacks, but, wanting as we were in reserves and