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 the state and communal commercial establishment, which fell into the hands of the organised workers, but they were soon followed by several big capitalist concerns, notably by the biggest enterprise of its kind in the country—the paper factories. Generally speaking the re-working of the factories stopped by the capitalists did not present any insurmountable difficulties to the workers. Doubtless the want of technical experts would later on have made itself felt more strongly than at first, but however, imperfect the resources at the workers' command, experience proved in most cheering fashion that the workers of Finland were capable of organising production. In the majority of industries much greater success was obtained than had ever been counted on.

On the other hand in the class-war itself, and in the organisation of the Red Army, mistakes irregularities and omissions were made, due largely, it is true, to lack of experience and technical knowledge, but also to the fact that sufficient attention was not paid to organising for the combat itself. Preparations for taking up the struggle were not sufficiently detailed or methodical and lacked energy. Not oven the arrest of the bourgeois agitators had been prepared for beforehand. The Red Army was at first formed solely of volunteers from the ranks of the organised workers; later unorganised workers were admitted; in some places they were forced to join the army; in others universal compulsory military service was set up, and even the bourgeoisie were sent to the front armed with rifles. Evidently the most practical measure would have been to adopt general compulsory service in the working class by calling up all men able to bear arms, or those of certain classes. Army pay, which was about the same as that received by a well-paid worker, need not have been so high. The provisioning of the army was organised in a satisfactory manner, but the need of footwear and clothing was great, especially the former. The transport and storage of munitions, so that they could be at hand when wanted, was at first badly organised, and never was really satisfactory. Worst of all was the organisation of the intelligence system. The organisation of corps of scouts at the back of tho army was also a mistake, and the action of this corps was harmful and a danger ta military operations. The fact that in the army on the front not even the simplest measures relating to the scout corps were put into practice,