Page:Oregon Historical Quarterly vol. 9.djvu/358

 330 T. W. Davenport. the doctrine of free will which inculcates the notion that man is a free moral-agent; that human beings have the power of free choice, either of good or evil, and therefore should be held responsible for their actions, under all conditions not involving their sanity. In support of such a contention, the believer says, "I can certainly do as I please, as I choose." Certainly. The words please and "choose" stand there in the place of the word will. But can you please, choose, or will to do a certain thing or not to do it, where there is no change of circumstances? "Certainly I can." "Well, then, spit in my face." "Oh! (laughing in derision) that would be foolish— but my will is free." "If so, spit in my face." ' ' Why, that would be absurd. " " Certainly, the act would be foolish and absurd, and more, it would be an offense against your sense of propriety, your kindly feelings for me, your friend and lover, and you could not be hired or persuaded to commit yourself to such an outrageous action. ' ' It is barely possible that you might be insulted, provoked, maddened to a state of mind suited to such an act, but then you would know that a change of circumstances had preceded the will. There is no case possible, none imaginable, in which a compelling impulse, either of affection, sentiment or pas- sion, or a combination of them, does not precede the volitional forces which bring on action. To call this fatality is a clear misconception of the nature of things. It is the furthest removed from the old notion of fatality; that whatever else may occur before it, that specific event at the time and place and manner will surely arrive. On the contrary, the doctrine of causation teaches that if we would avoid disagreeable events, we must avoid or modify the conditions which produce them. And as the conditions we have in view are social, in- dustrial and political, and all of them within the power of human beings collectively, the sphere and function of g')v- ernment takes on a rational aspect. We have been accustomed to take a partial and outside view of things, and looked upon man as the originator of his conduct, the chief actor who should be held solely accountable for what is done, when a