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 of 1946, and its contracts, facilities, and management responsibilities were transferred to the newly established Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).

The primary purpose of CROSSROADS was to determine the effects of atomic bombs upon naval vessels. The effects of nuclear weapons on ships was of considerable interest to the U.S. defense establishment. As early as August 1945, the Chairman of the Senate's Special Committee on Atomic Energy proposed that the effectiveness of atomic bombs be demonstrated on captured Japanese ships. In September, the Army Air Forces commanding general put the question of such a test before the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (Reference A.1, p. 10).

The Navy's response to this proposal was that such a test also should include a few modern U.S. naval units in the target array (Reference A.1, p. 10). In effect, this broadened the test from a mere demonstration of the power of nuclear detonations to a scientific test whose results could be used in designs of naval vessels and naval tactics. In November the JCS established a subcommittee to prepare a detailed proposal. The subcommittee completed its work in six weeks.

Secondary purposes of CROSSROADS were to afford training for Army Air Forces personnel in attack techniques using atomic bombs against ships, and to determine atomic bomb effects upon military equipment and installations. Such information was not available from the Trinity test or the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings (Reference C.9.189, p. XIII).

On 10 December 1945, the President announced that the United States would further explore the capabilities of atomic energy in the form of scientific atomic bomb tests under JCS jurisdiction. The JCS proposed a joint task force to be composed of Army and Navy personnel and civilian scientists, and on 10 January 1946 the President approved the formation of this task force. On 11 January the JCS created Joint Task Force One (JTF 1) and approved a naval officer who had commanded large Army-Navy operations in the Pacific during the war and who had also been Chief of the Navy's Bureau of Ordnance to serve as Commander JTF 1 (CJTF 1).

CROSSROADS, as proposed, was to have consisted of three nuclear events. In approving the plans, the President approved the detonation of three nuclear weapons, one-third of the U.S. stockpile at the time -- surely a measure of the importance given the operation (Reference A.7).

Among the major problems confronting CJTF 1 after his appointment was the selection of a test site. Several locations were considered in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and in the Caribbean Sea. The requirements were:


 * A protected anchorage (at least 6 nmi [11 km] wide) to hold the target and support fleet
 * A site that was nearly uninhabited
 * A location at least 300 statute miles (about 483 km) from a city
 * Freedom from severe cold and violent storms

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