Page:Operation Crossroads 1946.pdf/133

 because we knew so little about the dangers we were dealing with" (Reference C.0.78).

The complaints of the senior monitor to AtComKwaj were passed to higher authorities. CINCPAC, in a letter endorsement to Chief BuMed, stated that AtComKwaj had been instructed on 10 April to fully comply with existing safety regulations at the cost of curtailing security measures and, if necessary, falling behind in towing schedules. He noted that a serious health hazard existed if safety regulations were not strictly maintained (Reference C.11.22).

The problem was essentially one of manpower, as less than 200 personnel were assigned to the ship's security detail. This was too few personnel to maintain the desired schedule of preparing ships for tow back to Navy shipyards. This fact and its consequences were acknowledged in a letter from CNO to Chief of Naval Personnel dated 15 July 1947. The letter observed that in many instances certain recognized safety precautions were violated, attributable to the towing schedule, inadequate indoctrination of men, and insufficient supervisory personnel. It stated, however, that in the opinion of responsible persons experienced in the subject that, in fact, no individual actually was subjected to danger. In order to substantiate that opinion, the letter stated that a broad survey of all persons involved had been instituted (Reference C.0.33).

The results of this broad survey have not been located. The survey may refer to the blood tests administered to all Navy CROSSROADS participants (Reference C.11.23). There is evidence that action at Kwajalein in this regard was underway at least by April 1947. A 17 May message from AtComKwaj to BuMed advised that blood tests given at Kwajalein established that exposed personnel were disqualified from additional work detail. He noted that the results had urgent medical implications and impacted on personnel rotation policies (Reference C.11.24).

A standard gamma source to calibrate instruments was provided by 5 June 1947, and the hope was voiced that a suitable alpha counter could be provided "eventually." Moreover, the bureaus concerned were going to supply "essential technical help," apparently meaning more personnel (Reference B.11.1). This last effort probably was related to the monitor shortage at Kwajalein. During April 1947, the radsafe unit was down to one monitor; hence only one working party at a time could enter radiologically suspect areas (Reference C.0.29).

Commencing in June 1947, Kwajalein and all shipyards where target ships were located began monthly reports of personnel film badge exposures. These monthly reports to BuMed continued until November 1948. Until at least July 1948, a ship's security detail existed at Kwajalein to care for the target ships. Protective clothing was apparently worn by U.S. shipyard personnel when working with the CROSSROADS target ships, judging from an inspection photo (Figure 38) of the engine room of Hughes at Puget Sound in April 1948.

CONTAMINATION OF SUPPORT SHIPS

The majority of the support ships did not reenter Bikini Lagoon until after 31 July when the lagoon water was below 0.1 R/24 hours. Within 3 days,

128