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 eat, drink, smoke, or to chew gum or tobacco. They were to avoid pools of water, dust clouds, and piles of rust, paint chips, or the like since each might be a radiation source. When below decks, the men were to wear the rescue breathing apparatus at all times. Upon returning to the change house they were to turn in their film badges, disrobe, and wash thoroughly. The regulations appear to have broken little new ground but instead codified existing CROSSROADS practice (Reference C.11.9, pp. 1 through 8).

On 3 March 1947, Navy Bureau of Personnel reduced the Kwajalein ships' security detail to 5 officers and 127 enlisted men. Both CINCPAC and AtComKwaj considered this to be a minimum number. However, on 31 March there were only 27 men in the unit. The attempt by Kwajalein personnel to keep up with the towing schedule in spite of the manpower shortage operated to contravene the requirement for radiological safety (Reference C.11.10, p. 2).

In a letter to AtComKwaj dated 9 April 1947, the senior monitor assigned to the radsafe section at Kwajalein on 23 January described violations of radsafe procedures he has seen or had good reason to suspect during his time there. Upon arrival he had been given some instructions about radsafe procedures to be followed in working on the target ships, but he had been shown no written regulations. In his work, this Navy ensign observed men smoking and lounging about the decks of target ships and boarding parties going abroad Pensacola without first passing through the change ship. He believed that personnel sometimes ate aboard the target vessels and that work parties unaccompanied by a monitor sometimes boarded them. He believed looting was common. The monitor was also very concerned that men were not wearing rescue breathing apparatus while on the decks of the target vessels, but the BuMed regulations of 31 January did not make it mandatory in all circumstances (Reference C.0.27, pp. 7 and 8).

When the ensign reported his observations and suspicions to the Medical Radsafe Officer at Kwajalein, the doctor showed him a list of safety precautions for boarding target vessels sent by BuMed. From the monitor's letter it cannot be determined, however, whether these were the regulations of 31 January as amended or some other document. The doctor apparently had not been aware of the violations of BuMed's rules. On 13 March the monitor showed the safety precautions to the officer in charge of the change ship. Together they checked fatigues and found "numerous" high readings. The monitor's letter gives the impression that the officer in charge of the change ship had not previously seen the list of safety precautions.

The senior monitor also showed the precautions to the captain of the salvage vessel from which work parties had boarded Pensacola without passing first through the change ship. The captain visited the radsafe officer to discuss the precautions. The monitor's revelations led to a meeting on 20 March attended by the Medical Radsafe Officer, the captains of Conserver and Current, AtComKwaj, the monitors, and another official. Greater efforts to follow BuMed's guidelines apparently followed. The monitor also had been concerned about the unreliability of the radiation detection instruments, but the meeting did not produce actions that relieved his apprehension. He wrote that "our instruments are still very unreliable and I felt unsafe in boarding without proper equipment. I told [the radsafe officer] that I thought operations should cease

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