Page:Operation Crossroads 1946.pdf/130

 {| class="wikitable"
 * USS Crittenden (APA-77) || No ammunition aboard
 * USS Gasconade (APA-85) || No ammunition aboard
 * USS Hughes (DD-410) || No ammunition aboard
 * USS Independence (CVL-22) || No ammunition except two-thirds of the unfused normal bomb allowance remained aboard
 * USS Nevada (BB-33) || Two-thirds of the normal allowance remained aboard
 * USS New York (BB-36) || Ten percent of the 14-inch projectiles and eight percent of the remaining normal allowance remained aboard
 * USS Pensacola (CA-24) || No ammunition except two-thirds of the 8-inch projectile allowance and two-thirds of the unfused bomb allowance remained aboard
 * USS Salt Lake City (CA-25) || Ten percent of the normal allowance remained aboard
 * }
 * USS New York (BB-36) || Ten percent of the 14-inch projectiles and eight percent of the remaining normal allowance remained aboard
 * USS Pensacola (CA-24) || No ammunition except two-thirds of the 8-inch projectile allowance and two-thirds of the unfused bomb allowance remained aboard
 * USS Salt Lake City (CA-25) || Ten percent of the normal allowance remained aboard
 * }
 * USS Salt Lake City (CA-25) || Ten percent of the normal allowance remained aboard
 * }
 * }

When the initial phase of the ammunition disposal was completed, the last of the experienced radiological monitors departed Kwajalein. When work was resumed to unload the target ships due for transfer to the continental United States, the only available monitors were still receiving additional training at Kwajalein after intensive instruction in Washington, D.C. In addition, serious morale problems were developing in the Ammunition Disposal Unit due to doubts and unanswered fears about the effects of radiation and fatigue due to the long, uninterrupted arduous and hazardous duty.

The officer-in-charge dispatched a letter dated 11 November 1946 to the Chief, Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BuMed) (Reference C.11.7) detailing the concerns of personnel in his unit regarding radiation hazards. He described the problems in the use of the rescue breathing apparatus and the added hazards in handling heavy ammunition when wearing the apparatus in confined dangerous spaces. He recommended better indoctrination and training for those working under similar conditions, suitable limitation on the length of continuous duty, and -- if it was determined that a protective mask was required - discontinuance of all unloading until a suitable mask could be developed.

On 29 November the officer-in-charge was advised by the Safety Advisor to JTF 1 (Reference C.11.8) that the answers to some of the questions asked by the men were classified and, in any event, the officer in charge of the Ammunition Disposal Unit should discuss these questions with the Radsafe Advisor and then disseminate the proper information to his personnel. He was further informed that the rescue breathing apparatus was considered necessary by senior radsafe experts and would continue to be worn and that if all safety regulations were compelled with no hazard to health was involved in the work. Hence, BuMed did not feel it was necessary to limit the time spent in this type of work (Reference C.11.8).

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