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 Pensacola posed the most urgent removal problem due to the deterioration of the gunpowder for the 8-inch guns in its forward magazines, with resultant concentration of ether-alcohol fumes believed to be within explosive limits (Reference C.0.22, p. 4). The same conditions, to a lesser degree, were felt possible in some of the other target vessels. CTG 1.2 issued supplementary orders to the officer in charge of the Ammunition Disposal Unit covering Pensacola. The progressive opening up of Pensacola preparatory to removal of ammunition was initiated following the procedures laid down by CTG 1.2 (Reference C.0.4, p. 4). In early September ammunition breakout was started on New York, Carteret, and Wainwright.

By mid-September, because of the acute shortage of radiological monitors questions were raised as to the advisability of continuing ammunition disposal at the rate of progress imposed earlier (Reference C.0.23, p. 4). At this time questions were also raised by CTG 1.2 regarding the dangers attendant to leading large quantities of stable ammunition aboard ships exposed to tropical temperatures in unventilated and uncooled magazines without adequate inspection and surveillance. He cautioned that removal of such ammunition would multiply the difficulties of the ongoing task several times over and should not be considered lightly. Although he felt that the hazard of leaving the ammunition aboard was acceptable in view of the well-established stability of the smokeless powder under the expected range in temperature, he recommended that the advice and recommendations of the Navy Bureau of Ordnance be obtained before a decision was made (Reference C.0.23, p. 6).

The potential for plutonium contamination continued to be a concern, and rescue breathing apparatus was used to reduce the risk. One monitor was especially concerned because as time passed the detectable emissions, "our warning signals," were "dying away," leaving behind the difficult-to-detect alpha emitters (Reference A.2, p. 147). Urine testing continued, apparently on a relatively large scale. This testing failed to produce any positive findings of alpha exposure (Reference C.0.32, p. 4; Reference C.11.12).

On 14 September the concern about alpha emitters manifested itself from another quarter in instructions from the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), prohibiting all hoisting and underwater repairs on boats at Kwajalein. Apparently CTU 1.2.12 was able to get permission to follow instead the 9 September message from CJTF 1 to commanders of nontarget ships suspected of being contaminated, which allowed scraping of underwater portions of the hulls as long as the working area was kept wet (Reference C.9.185, p. 136). Because no copy of the directive could be found, boat repairs at Kwajalein were temporarily curtailed (Reference C.11.5, p. 2).

Despite the severe problems imposed by the shortage of monitors and handling equipment, the ammunition removal and disposal proceeded according to schedule without incident. During the week ending 13 October, radsafe operations were routine, but the instrument situation was becoming critical due to the lack of spare parts. Only ten X-263 Geiger counters were operable, and no spare parts for repairs were on hand. None had been received since 14 August, and it was estimated that within 3 weeks none of the instruments would be operating (Reference C.0.24, pp. 3 and 4). By the week of 19 October, ammunition safety tasks (i.e., removing and disposing of unstable ammunition and

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