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 radar technology. Quoting the authors: “Early American radio astronomy did not have the same big impact as the programs in the UK and Australia.” This external pressure was a major factor galvanizing the US scientific community into activity. In this time period, the obvious way forward was to build an even bigger dish than the British (250 foot) or the Australian (210 foot) radio telescopes. With the vision of building a very large antenna of perhaps 600 foot diameter this was “big science.”

The establishment of a national radio astronomy facility in the USA is a fascinating story with many obstacles and detractors. The authors provide excellent context for the formation of NRAO by including detailed archival research on the steps that were involved. This is a well-informed and deep analysis of how decisions were being made. The National Science Board had already made a declaration for government support of large-scale basic scientific facilities (i.e., support for big science) and had given the construction of a major radio astronomy facility as an example. This impacted NSF policy and was the beginning of the national facility concept. A concept which was pioneered by the USA and later adopted in many other countries. However, establishing a national facility was not supported by all parties and throughout the book we can read lively accounts of the ongoing debate for and against the “big science” national facility concept instead of smaller groups of young innovative scientists based in the universities. This reached an extreme in the ongoing disagreements and confrontations between Merle Tuve (DTM) and Lloyd Berkner who was the president of AUI, the organization that ran the Brookhaven National Laboratory, a “big science” national facility for particle physics research.

Lloyd Berkner had a huge impact on the development of the National Radio Astronomy Observatory. The authors note that Berkner may not have the name recognition as some of the other American postwar science policy leaders such as Vannevar Bush, Robert Oppenheimer, or I.I. Rabi, but perhaps no one had a broader impact on mid-twentieth-century science policy. They include one extraordinary example: Berkner became the first Chair of the National Academy of Science Space Studies Board and he sent a strongly worded memorandum to NASA Administrator James Webb stating that “Scientific exploration of the Moon and planets should be clearly stated as the ultimate objective of the U.S. space program. ... Scientific exploration of the Moon and planets must at once be developed on the premise that man will be included. Failure to adopt and develop our national program upon this premise will inevitably prevent man’s inclusion, and every effort should be made to establish the feasibility of manned space flight at the earliest opportunity.” Less than 2 months later, in a special address to joint session of Congress, President John F. Kennedy conveyed Berkner’s message stating that “this nation should set as a goal before this decade is out, of landing of a man on the moon and returning him safely to the Earth.”

When David Heeschen became Director of NRAO in late 1962 he presented a clear view of the role of a National Facility. NRAO’s multiple