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 . 23, 1861.] Napoleon supposed that by upholding the defence of Gaëta he was playing into the hands of the reactionary party, and enabling them to keep the Two Sicilies in such a state of turmoil that European interference might have become a necessity, he has also been disappointed in this respect. A flying column of Sardinians, with the hearty co-operation of the peasantry, has been sufficient to restore order. It has been proved to conviction, that brigandage as a reactionary element is of no great account. If the prolonged defence of Gaëta has not been available for the purpose of promoting disorder, in the most vulgar acceptation of the term, neither has it influenced the elections. What between Louis Napoleon’s exertions on the one side, and the efforts of Signor Mazzini on the other, the Neapolitans have had the sense to see that the safety of the Two Sicilies depended upon their remaining staunch to the cause of Italian unity. They have done so—and have accordingly elected men of moderate opinions, but well known as true lovers of their country, to represent them in the Italian parliament.

Again, if the French Emperor intended by the detention of his fleet before Gaëta to give satisfaction to the Absolutist and Ultra-Montane faction in his own country, that satisfaction has been transitory indeed, and has been replaced by the bitterest disappointment. It will now be said that he has betrayed the young Bourbon’s cause, simply because he upheld it for a brief space, and then abandoned it in despair. Nor has Gaëta proved a very formidable breakwater for the defence of the Pope’s temporal power. Now, as before, he is surrounded on all sides by the hostile bayonets of the Italians, and is defended from day to day solely by the French troops in garrison at Rome. So thoroughly is the government of the Pope and the priests execrated in Italy, that were the French to evacuate Rome to-morrow, the presence on the spot of a few Sardinian regiments would be instantly necessary, in order to save the priests from the anger of the people. Let devout Roman Catholics explain the matter as they will, such is the fact.

It is difficult, however, to believe that the fall of Gaëta will lead to decisive action at Rome. All we know is, that the French garrison, both at Civita Vecchia and at Rome, has been heavily reinforced, and that the French army generally has been placed upon a war-footing. This does not look much like concession. At the same time, Louis Napoleon must soon make his election between an act of violence, such as would stultify his own previous policy, and prove to his subjects that their sacrifices of blood and treasure in the Lombard campaign had been thrown away; or, he must prolong the occupation of Rome and the Patrimony of St. Peter as heretofore, and thereby render himself and the French name odious to the Italian people; or he must come to some arrangement with the sovereign who will no doubt soon be acknowledged as King of Italy for the safeguard of the Pope as a spiritual ruler. Politically speaking, this must be done by the Italians themselves. They could never tolerate the occupation by foreign troops of a central point in the peninsula, in easy communication with a fortified harbour and arsenal, which in the hands of a strong naval power would be practically impregnable. The Pope, after all, must be somewhere; and no doubt the Italians would be willing enough to acquiesce in his residence at Rome, so that he remained there simply in his spiritual capacity. Nor is it likely that they would urge any strong objection to a guarantee of the Roman Catholic Powers—so the terms were simple, and such as would not easily expose them to the danger of foreign intervention upon frivolous pretexts.

Such an arrangement with regard to the Pope, and the purchase of Venetia from embarrassed Austria, would be the natural settlement of the Italian question; but we must look for many evil days, and many struggles yet, before Italy and Europe arrive at so favourable a conclusion. Meanwhile the existing evils are not wholly without compensation. As long as the Italians are threatened from without, they cannot afford to indulge in the luxury of domestic dissension. There does not, indeed, exist the shadow of a reason for charging them with such an inclination; for the moderation, forbearance, and sobriety of thought, of which they have given proof since these troubles began, have been almost without a parallel in history. Again it is only in times of difficulty that the foremost men of a nation rise to the direction of affairs—and for a generation or two to come Italy is much in need of the counsels of her wisest men. It is only under continuous pressure, moreover—as far as the multitudes are concerned—that the temporary exaltation of the moment is hardened by habit into real power. All men—at least most men—are brave and prepared for self-sacrifice by fits and starts; but the soldier is brave, and prepared to give his life for his country when a drum is beaten, or a trumpet calls him forth. Now, what Italy requires is the disciplined courage of the soldiers—not the violent, but transitory enthusiasm of the mere patriot. Italian independence must be maintained with the old prosaic helps of strong armies, well-appointed fleets, and well furnished arsenals. The government which is powerful to maintain independence against the foreigner, will also be strong to maintain order at home. That also is an Italian necessity. Nor should it be forgotten that one of the most serious dangers which threatens Italy, is lest she should degenerate into a satellite and satrapy of France. Now, if Louis Napoleon should persist in his present policy, he will blot out the recollection of his past services, and make his own name, and that of France, odious throughout Italy. In Rome and throughout the Two Sicilies, even as it is, the French are not very popular. The continued occupation of Rome, and the detention of the French fleet before Gaëta, are quite sufficient to explain this result. In the north of the Peninsula the extortion from Piedmont of Savoy and Nice, as the blood-money for Magenta and Solferino, has not particularly improved the relations between the Italians and their French allies. Nor in Central Italy have the efforts of the French Emperor to realise the clauses of his Italian programme had much tendency to maintain the enthusiasm of the nation for his name at fever point. After Villafranca, Louis Napoleon was