Page:Once a Week Dec 1860 to June 61.pdf/234

 . 16, 1861.] scruples. Whatever British statesmen may believe, the opinion of the Prussian king and his advisers certainly is that the independence of Prussia is threatened.

At the opening of the Chambers at Berlin the other day, the king expressed himself in the gloomiest manner as to the turn events might take, and that ere long. Here, then, we have contradictory statements made—with the interval of but a few days between them—in Berlin, and in London. The Oracle at Paris is not very clear; but what meaning can be disengaged from its mystic phrases would rather seem to be of an ominous kind, and that the more when it is considered in connection with the warlike preparations urged forward in such haste throughout the length and breadth of the French Empire—more especially upon the Rhenish and Eastern frontier.

, again, we received intelligence from Berlin that M. Von Vincke’s amendment during the discussion upon the address had been carried by a majority of 159 against 146 votes in the Chamber of Deputies, and that despite of the most determined efforts upon the part of Baron Von Schleinitz and the Ministerialists. But in truth here is somewhat more than a check to a Ministry: the carrying of this amendment is a positive veto imposed by the country on the policy of the sovereign. The terms of the amendment were to the effect—“That we do not consider it to be either for the interest of Prussia or of Germany to place obstacles in the way of the consolidation of the unity of Italy.” It was in vain that the Minister protested that the Prussian Government had not the least reason to be opposed to the development of Italy: that although it did not consider the principle of non-intervention as binding, it had not actually interfered in Italy: that the position of Venetia was, in a military sense, too important to Austria directly, and indirectly to Germany, to allow of its cession being advised by Prussia: that in all probability both Austria and Sardinia would content themselves with the maintenance of a defensive attitude, and that through the influence of the Great Powers a final contest would certainly be postponed, and, possibly, might be altogether averted: and, finally, that the Prussian Government had resolved not in any way to interfere with the national Italian movement, so long as it remained a national movement and did not assume a development which seemed to carry with it a threat to the stability of German power. Every effort, in short, was made to meet the amendment half way, and to treat it as though all that was really vital in it had been actually incorporated into the policy of the Prussian Government, but only with such prudent reserves as would recommend themselves upon the most cursory consideration to the easy acceptance of every German Liberal. The Prussian deputies were well aware that this was but a hollow pretence, and that even if no positive engagement subsisted, there had been an understanding between the sovereigns of Southern and of Northern Germany that Prussia would not fail Austria in her need, if the Austrian possession of Venetia was seriously attacked. What renders this event the more remarkable is, that M. Von Vincke, who is really a man with some claim to be considered a Liberal in the English and parliamentary sense of the word, and who was a very foremost man indeed in the Frankfort Parliament after the events of 1848, has, by proposing this amendment, abandoned the ground which he then occupied. In those days he struggled—no man more effectively—to liberate Germany from the great and petty despotisms under which she had been groaning since the fall of Napoleon Bonaparte. When the question, however, of the liberation of Italy was mooted amongst the German Liberals of that period, it found but few abettors—and certainly M. Von Vincke was not amongst the number. Twelve years have made a difference in his views; and, let us hope, in common with the other German Liberals, he now sees that in the interests of Freedom and Independence it is better that a nation should be surrounded by free and independent nations, than that it should have this or that river, this or that mountain, as its boundary. It would be difficult to struggle for the cause of Freedom on one side of the Alps, and for that of Slavery and Oppression on the other.

This is a very notable event, that the German Liberals have resolved at last to give up that which hitherto has been to them a point of national honour and pride—namely, the right of keeping the Italians in thraldom. It would be an illustration of this change in the political and public opinions of Germany, if we Englishmen were to carry our thoughts back to the time when penal laws, political disabilities, and religious exclusions pressed most heavily upon the people of Ireland, and to imagine how an English Radical would have been received amongst his fellow Radicals, if he had proposed that there should be an entire end of English dominion in Ireland, and that, in fact, England ought to give up Ireland altogether. This resolution of the Prussian Parliament is pre-eminently the event of ; for whatever importance may be attached to the proceedings of the British Parliament, and the declarations of the British Minister, these at least were foreseen. We knew well enough that the inhabitants of these islands had no ambitious designs to be carried out upon the continent of Europe. It was also clear that any Minister who endeavoured to entangle this country in engagements with foreign powers, or to commit us to hostilities with foreign sovereigns, could scarcely reckon upon any prolonged lease of office. If we are forced into a quarrel, we must be forced into it indeed! Other nations—pre-eminently France—have intervened in the affairs of foreign countries from selfish motives. Our forefathers alone were so ill-advised as to be carried away by whiffs of sentiment and enthusiasm, and thus committed themselves to a series of deadly struggles, now in the Spanish peninsula—now in Belgium—now in South America—and they reaped their reward in the ingratitude, not to say in the abhorrence, of those whom they had endeavoured to assist with all their might. If the English people have learnt the great lesson of moderation and sobriety of thought in matters connected with foreign policy, this has been the result of bitter experience, and many a fruitless sacrifice. We feel at last that