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 195 Prussia, at the present moment, can look only to this country in the hour of need for any serious assistance. Russia lies too far off, and is hamstrung. If a rifle is discharged in Europe, Austria will be struggling for her own existence, and will scarcely be able to array an army upon the banks of the Rhine. As for the troops of the minor powers of the confederation, France has invariably given good account of them since nations have contended with regular armies at all. But will the English people—speaking by the mouths of their representatives—consent to engage in such a quarrel at all?—still more, would they consent to engage in it if the assistance of England were not sought until the nation seeking it had practically committed suicide? Prussia, with her armies and resources intact, is one thing; Prussia defeated—her capital in possession of a foreign invader, and her king in flight, is quite another. In calculating our own risks, we should consider the effective power of that nation and sovereign who may seek our aid.

Of course, in the present day, as far as this country is concerned, dynastic and sentimental considerations are out of the question. We all wish well to that fair young Princess who was so lately the ornament of the British Court. Could we make her husband’s inheritance secure without calling down calamity upon our own people, we would cheerfully do so. This, however, cannot be: it is not by personal sympathies with royal houses that the affairs of the world are settled in our time. There would be serious danger to England if France should destroy, one by one, the great military powers of Europe, largely extend her frontiers, and obtain a complete preponderance on the continent. This is the only ground upon which any government could ask of the British psople to engage themselves once more in the hazards of a continental war. In any case, if we were to do so at all—a matter not much in accordance with the present temper of the nation—we should at least claim a voice in council, and decline to prescribe for the patient, if we were not called in until he were dead.

Let us not deceive ourselves. Whatever turn matters may take in the coming spring, England can no longer afford to fight a continental war by subsidies. Nor, if we are commonly prudent, would we risk the small army which we absolutely require as a home-garrison, and as the nucleus of our own defence, if our own turn should come at last, upon the soil of the continent. It was all well enough to entrust what forces we could raise to the care of a commander of consummate skill, when, if we had been defeated, the reserve behind us was Europe in arms, and when France had been exhausted by the hostilities of a quarter of a century. The hazard was awful enough even so; but with the resources of France intact, with India upon our hands, and with the necessity in which this country stands of working at high-pressure in order to support its taxation, we cannot afford once more to expend an army of 30,000 or 40,000 trained troops upon the plains of Belgium. That would not be the most proper ground on which to make our stand if we were compelled to do so at all.

As though this miserable business of Schleswig-Holstein were not enough, the belief now appears to be that if Austria were attacked in Venetia, or if there should be a fresh insurrection in Hungary—and the second contingency is probable enough—she has obtained promises of assistance from without. Now in such a matter Russia could scarcely do again what she did in the days of the Czar Nicholas. Her own abortive efforts in the Crimea, and the deep ingratitude of Austria forbid such a conclusion. The aid then can only come from Germany; and here again the Germans would be but playing the game of France, and leaving the Rhenish provinces exposed to the covetous grasp of the French Emperor.

Under such circumstances the sentences of the speech just delivered by the British Queen to her Parliament, will be scanned with unusual interest. The formal phrases of “continued assurances of friendship from all foreign powers,” though expressions of course, have a meaning in the lips of Queen Victoria. What she says at least is known to be the truth. Even the habitual calumniators of England are aware that we have not, and cannot have any dreams of ambition, or of territorial aggrandizement upon the continent of Europe. Our interest, and our inclination concur in the maintenance of peace. Never did British statesmen have before them a nobler, or a more difficult task than during the present year. In their hands lie the only chances for the preservation of the peace of Europe—and these chances may well be neutralised by the folly and fatuity of foreign statesmen. Throughout the session which now commences our minds must be far more intently directed to foreign affairs than to those great questions of reform and domestic interest, which we would more gladly take up. We must put these islands in such a state of defence that, upon any contingency which may arise, any continental sovereign would desire to leave us at least in peace. Even if Louis Napoleon indulges the dream at all, the time for measuring his strength with Great Britain is not yet come. It is only when Europe is at his feet that he will venture to run the risk of a maritime war with the British navy, despite of his iron-cased frigates, and the great preparations already made in the arsenals of the empire.

From the considerations mentioned then it would seem to follow that those clauses in the Royal Speech which treat of foreign affairs are those which most especially deserve attention. With such a spring and such a summer before us, it would be vain to expect that the two Houses of Parliament should carry through any large measure of Reform, or indeed any considerable change in our domestic arrangements. The Session opens with a taxation of 70,000,000l. (independently of local rates and taxes)—with Europe in arms, and with grievous danger that the great Confederation on the other side of the Atlantic may be dissolved into two or more groups of independent states. We cannot pretend, with any feeling of confidence, to see far into the future. One thing is clear—that we must be prepared for any contingency; for it seems as though, in the long run, Great Britain must be prepared to stand alone. The pressure of