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are gathering thickly around us on every side. The very air is as it were charged with electricity—and it will be strange indeed if the year 1861 passes away without change and turmoil. The most significant symptoms of trouble are, on the one side, the gradual disruption of the Austrian empire, and the enormous military preparations of France; on the other, the disunion of the North American Union. The one means a European war, in which, if this country is not called upon to take a share, we may reckon ourselves fortunate indeed; the second, a temporary cessation in the supply of cotton, upon the regularity of which about a fourth of our own population depends for subsistence. The coming spring will decide what turn events are to take for the next few years.

There can be little doubt that the action of France in Italian affairs is not the result of any vacillation or uncertainty upon the part of the French Emperor, as has been sometimes suggested. Louis Napoleon sees clearly enough that the creation of a great maritime Mediterranean power seriously imperils the future policy of France in that quarter of Europe. Even upon the supposition that an independent Italy remained for a time a satrapy of France—partly on account of its military necessities, and partly through gratitude for benefits received—still, as its strength grew with years, that subordination of policy and sentiment would disappear. The Italians are more sailors by natural inclination than the French. An Italian commercial navy would arise at once, as soon as the country was fairly rid of the tyrannical governments which have paralysed and restrained the spirit of enterprise throughout the Peninsula. A navy for war purposes follows, as of course, from the existence of a large commercial navy. It is then a plant of natural growth, and vigorous as all natural productions are;—not an exotic, the mere creature of artifice and arrangement, destined to fade and wither away if the gardener should forget one night to light the subterranean fire upon which its existence depends. The English navy is powerful because the commerce of England is so enormous. The navies of Holland and of the Baltic Powers are strong proportionately to the number of their commercial marine. The United States of North America have never thought it worth their while to keep up any considerable navy for war purposes, but they are always looked upon as formidable antagonists at sea, because the sea is already covered with their ships, and because the sailors who man these ships could be converted into man-of-war’s men at a moment’s notice. With Russia it is otherwise. The Russian fleet is numerically strong, but weak in seamanship, and in the seaman’s spirit. The navy of France again, so great have been the care and forethought bestowed upon it, has been brought up to so high a point of efficiency, that many competent judges have doubted what would be the first results of a conflict between it and the maritime armaments of England. These results, however, could be doubtful only for a moment. What has happened any time during the last five centuries would happen again when the spirit of the country was fairly roused, and the official personages charged with the administration of the Navy had been brought to their senses. Even if mechanical skill and the possession of iron and coal are to be the conditions of success, instead of superior seamanship, England is not worse placed in the race than heretofore. It is, if we mistake not, an apprehension of what may be the consequences of a development of the capacities of the Italians for maritime dominion, which gives pause to the counsels of the French Emperor. Hand him over the Island of Sardinia, or a section of the Italian coast which would include Genoa, and he might be inclined to take a favourable view of the question.

It is a curious fact that Napoleon Bonaparte, .an Italian himself—if ever there was one—has left it upon record that it was always a cardinal point in his policy to restrain the growth of Italian power. Whether his opinion was right or wrong, it was to the effect that the Italians, if free and independent, might one day become a great danger to Europe.

The intelligence from Italy during the is of a very chequered complexion. On the one hand we hear that the French ships of war have at last taken their departure from before Gaëta. Cialdini and Persano are now left to deal with that fortress. Until Gaëta is reduced, it will be impossible to restore order in the Two Sicilies; and, even when this event shall happen, the French Emperor has bequeathed a fearful legacy to Victor Emmanuel and his advisers. The partisans of the Bourbon have had time to combine for resistance, and to over-run the country. They must be met, and dispersed, and when dispersed they will be even more troublesome than when united; still the thing must be done. It is difficult to see how tranquillity can be ultimately restored, save by the proclamation of military law, and it is to be feared by military executions, which, however necessary, are not exactly the measures by which a new Sovereign would wish to commence his administration. The Bourbons, especially those who have borne rule in the Two Sicilies, have a knack of leaving their successors to deal with a plague of brigands. The First Bonaparte, not a very patient man, after making trial of a few palliatives, gave orders that the mayors and municipal authorities of the various towns and villages, as well as the townsmen and villagers, should be made responsible for the brigandage committed within their respective limits. If the French could catch the brigand, that was well enough. They hung him. If not, they hung the mayor. It was a rough way of dealing with the difficulty, but it answered.

The truth is, that this is a work which the Neapolitans and Sicilians, if a long course of tyranny and subjection had not emasculated their spirit, ought to do for themselves. They have no right to call in the Sardinians as their executioners. If Garibaldi and his companions first, and Victor Emmanuel and his regular troops afterwards, have driven away the King from his capital, taken his strong places, dispersed his army, seized his fleet,