Page:Once a Week, Series 1, Volume II Dec 1859 to June 1860.pdf/602

16, 1860.] having a central lull, at the rate of eighty miles an hour, the whole storm did not progress at a greater speed than twenty miles an hour—an express train, in fact, would have run away from it—and places in the north-east of Scotland did not come within its influence until a day after it had ravaged the south coast. Admiral Fitzroy deduces from this fact, that we shall possibly be enabled in future to telegraph the approach of storms. Thus, if the unfortunate Royal Charter had been telegraphed from the southern point of England of the approach of the cyclone in which she was lost, and for which there would have been ample time, she might have steamed out of her perilous position, and received the hurricane in the comparative safety of an open sea.

Are our sailors more reckless than those of other nations, or are our ships worse built, found, and navigated? We ask the question because of the remarkable fact, that very nearly double the number of casualties occur to British ships than to those of other nations employed in precisely the same service—the coasting trade of the United Kingdom; and this remarkable discrepancy seems an increasing one, for while the casualties of British coasters rose from 927 in 1858 to 1187 in 1859, the casualties to foreign ships similarly employed have decreased from 209 to 188! As it is certain that we are not less skilful than other maritime nations, this remarkable discrepancy can only be accounted for by the drunkenness of our captains, and the want of ordinary care on board our ships. Mr. Lindsay boldly asserted before a committee of the House of Commons, that in consequence of these known faults on board British ships, shippers generally gave the preference to foreign vessels, feeling certain that their goods would arrive at their destination in better order and more securely than if sent in native craft. If this be true, it affords a remarkable instance of the material loss entailed upon the country by our national habit of intemperance.

There can be no doubt, however, that one fertile source of disaster among British shipping springs out of the go-a-head character of the times. Collisions have for years been on the increase—the numbers having run up from 57 in 1852 to 349 in 1859. The introduction of steam has been the main cause of this blundering conduct, for the pace has been greatly increased without a corresponding vigilance with respect to the look-out. It would seem almost impossible for two ships to come together in the open channel by daylight, but such wilful mishaps are constantly occurring owing to the disregard of the rule of the road, and the blundering manner in which steamers go a-head without looking before them. The proverbial carelessness of the sailor is fully borne out by the list of causes to which shipwrecks are attributable. The simple duty of casting the lead—a practice which enables the bewildered seaman to ascertain for certainty, and with little trouble, whether he is near land or not—is, in the great majority of cases, neglected altogether. Another most reckless piece of carelessness on the part of seamen is to neglect to shackle spare anchors on to their chains. We can only feebly parallel such recklessness as this, by supposing coachmen who had long down-hill journeys to perform, to stow away the skid in the front boot.

There are other causes at work in modern ships which lead to shipwrecks, which are little suspected. Among these are the effects of masses of iron upon the compass, especially in iron ships. It seems extraordinary that the precaution of “swinging” the ship, for the purpose of ascertaining if there is any deviation of the compass, should be confined to Queen’s ships. Emigrant vessels go to sea with as many lives, and often of a more valuable character than a second-rate, yet this precaution is utterly neglected. It is believed that an iron tank on board the Reliance Indiaman, which was lost with all hands near Ambleteuse, on the French coast, within sight of our shores, after a voyage from the East, was the cause of the disaster. When the Agamemnon adjusted compasses preparatory to sailing with the Atlantic telegraphic cable, it was found that there was a deviation in her compass of no less than seventeen degrees! Nevertheless, a ship will sail for India with a cargo of railway iron in perfect ignorance that her compass, under such circumstances, is only a delusion and a snare. But it does not require a mass of iron to vitiate the trembling needle, and turn it into an instrument of destruction instead of safety. A very small particle of this metal will suffice, provided it be only placed near the binnacle. A singular instance of this occurred during the Crimean war. A transport sailing with troops and stores was observed to shape her course safely enough by day; but at night her steering was perfectly wild. The whole thing was a complete puzzle, until some one suggested that possibly the binnacle lamps had something to do with it, and, on examining them, it was found that concealed iron hoops had been introduced to strengthen their framework. Underneath brass-work, in the form of hand-rails, stoves, &c., iron is generally found lurking in the immediate vicinity of the compass—thus, unknown to the navigator, a second hand may be said to be at the wheel, counteracting the calculations of the helmsman, and often sending the ship on to the sunken rock. It is the custom now, in some iron-built ships, to have what is termed a standard compass placed at the head of the lower mizen-mast—an elevation sufficient to take it out of the influence of the iron in the hull. The Great Eastern is, we believe, fitted with one of these compasses by which to correct the errors of the compass on deck.

Another source of shipwreck is also to be attributed to the want of scientific accuracy—we allude to the defect in the generality of charts used by the merchant marine. It is very often the case that a ship will sail with some antiquated map of an utterlessutterly [sic] worthless character. The Admiralty are obliged to post up their own charts within twenty-four hours of any intelligence of the change of buoys or the erection of new lighthouses having reached head-quarters. Private chart sellers should most certainly be compelled to correct their plates at the earliest possible date, otherwise they prove but blind leaders of the blind.