Page:Once a Week, Series 1, Volume II Dec 1859 to June 1860.pdf/210

 25, 1860.] We will suppose that as the French are not buccaneers, their object is not to make a raid on the coast, but to pay us off for the occupations of Paris by an occupation of London.

To attain this object, they must, first of all, be permanent masters of the sea,—our Channel fleet, the fleet at Spithead, and the reserves being either taken, or dispersed, or blockaded in their harbours. For the French to succeed in anything but a raid, or the empty glory of hoisting their flag in some town on the coast, such as Brighton or Hastings, there must be no English fleet upon the sea.

One great rule of war is, that all operations are made upon a base-line between two points, which must be forts or fortified harbours containing supplies, and upon which points an army can retire in case of reverse. A second rule is, that the distance between these base-points increases in a fixed ratio to the distance to be advanced. That is, the further an army has to march, the broader must be the base of operations. A third rule is, that all operations must be on lines perpendicular to the base-line. And a fourth rule is, that there must be a complete communication between the two points of the base-line, and also between all the points of operation upon it. From this last rule may be deduced the corollary, that an army should have all its enemies in its front. There is such a thing as a “flying column,” or a colonne en air, as the French call it, which is a body of troops equipped, not for speed, as is generally supposed, but with supplies and the munitions of war, to enable it to operate without a base and in all directions. A flying column is seldom used in regular warfare among civilised nations, but to a great extent by us in India, and by the French in Algeria. An army can act contrary to these rules when it has on either flank an arm of the sea, or a river, or a chain of mountains, or any other obstacle to prevent the operations of an enemy.

Let me exemplify the above rules by the operations of the Allies in the Crimea—ground with which we ought all to be so familiar. The base was short, from Kamiesh Bay to Balaclava. If the operations had been extended farther into the peninsula, it would have been necessary to extend the base to the east. The base could not have been from Eupatoria to any point to the south, because the operations against Sebastopol would have been outside the base, and perpendicular to no point of it. Although our troops could see strings of waggons bringing supplies daily from the north into the besieged city, yet we could not attempt to cut them off, because an advance by us would have placed Sebastopol in our rear.

To enable the French to march to London, they must have a base, and a broad one too. Sheerness on the right flank, and Dover on the left, with possession of Deal and all the harbours on the coast between those two places, is the best base our coast offers. On the right of the operations there would be the Medway and the Thames; and the distance from the French coast to one point of the base would be the shortest sea-passage that exists—a great advantage. But it would be impossible for an army to advance without getting possession of Sheerness and Dover, both of which, it would be hoped, could stand a siege of two months at least. Chatham is on the road between Sheerness and London, and, though a weak place, it could not be left without being taken, for it would be a standing threat on the right flank of the enemy’s operations.

The coast between Dover and Newhaven offers only a poor base. The harbour of the latter place is tidal and small, and is besides commanded by the rising land to the west.

Between Newhaven and Bournemouth the harbours are not adapted for the disembarking of large bodies of troops and of the matériel of war—such as guns, shot, and shell, horses, and commissariat stores. The troop-ships would have to anchor in the open roadsteads, and the process of landing troops, even if it was ever so well organised, would be tedious; and a gale of wind would put a stop to it altogether, and would jeopardise the safety of those already landed. If a reverse happens to troops where they cannot defend themselves, or receive succour from their ships, or re-embark, they must lay down their arms. This shows the necessity of having forts or fortified harbours at the extremities of the base of operations.

There is a good base to be found on the coast between Bournemouth and Lymington, for the Solent affords one continued anchorage, and the means of landing troops in smooth water. It is generally supposed that every French general has in his pocket a detailed plan of a march to London; and if they could all be induced to lay the produce of their brains on a table, I have no doubt it would be found that the majority of them would suggest that the Solent should contain one point, if not both, in the base of operations. The locality presents one little difficulty in the fortifications round Portsmouth harbour. The Duke used to say, that Portsmouth was not defensible; but when the new line of forts from the head of the harbour to the Solent is finished, a French general might hesitate before he commenced the siege as part of his programme of a march to London,—that is, if the Emperor will only wait till the forts are finished, which he will probably not do. Though there are some fine harbours west of the Solent, particularly Portland Bay, yet the further we go west, the greater become the distances from the French coast, and from our coast to London; and when we once get round Land’s End, this difficulty increases.

On examining the coast to the north from the mouth of the Thames, it will be found that there are no defensible harbours affording points for a base of operations. The Wash is a mud-flat at low water, and Yarmouth is an open roadstead. Supposing that the operations are undertaken with a view to the occupation of London, on a large scale and according to the rules of war, it will be seen that there are only two parts of the coast which could be selected on bases of operations with any hopes of success—namely, from Sheerness to Dover, and from Bournemouth to Lymington. As for the number of troops required to defend London, we ought to give our Minister of War credit for being the best judge of the situation. What he and other wise heads think is required is being done; and when the tug of war