Page:On the Fourfold Root, and On the Will in Nature.djvu/199

 more correctly, they are general expressions for the established classes of representations which, at all times, have been more or less clearly distinguished in those cognitive faculties. But, with reference to the necessary correlate of these representations as their condition, i.e., the Subject, these faculties are abstracted from them (the representations), and stand consequently towards the classes of representations in precisely the same relation as the Subject in general towards the Object in general. Now, just as the Object is at once posited with the Subject (for the word itself would otherwise have no meaning), and conversely, as the Subject is at once posited with the Object—so that being the Subject means exactly as much as having an Object, and being an Object means the same thing as being known by the Subject—so likewise, when an Object is assumed as being determined in any particular way, do we also assume that the Subject knows precisely in that particular way. So far therefore it is immaterial whether we say that Objects have such and such peculiar inherent determinations, or that the Subject knows in such and such ways. It is indifferent whether we say that Objects are divided into such and such classes, or that such and such different cognitive faculties are peculiar to the Subject. In that singular compound of depth and superficiality, Aristotle, are to be found traces even of insight into this truth, and indeed the critical philosophy lies in embryo in his works. He says: ἡ φυχὴ τὰ ὀντα πώς ἐστι πάντα (anima quammodo est universa, quæ sunt). And again: ὁ νούς ἐστι είδος είδῶν, i.e., the understanding is the form of forms, καί ἡ αίσθησις είδος αίσθητῶν, and sensibility the form of sensuous objects. Accordingly, it is all one whether we say, "sensibility and understanding are no more;" or, "the world is