Page:On Guerrilla Warfare (United States Marine Corps translation).djvu/33

Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare of the opposing leadership; the presence or absence of material help, technical aid, advisers, or "volunteers" from outside sources; the availability of a sanctuary; the relative military efficiency and the political flexibility of the incumbent government are naturally relevant to the ability of a movement to survive and expand.

In specific aspects, revolutionary guerrilla situations will of course differ, but if the Castro movement, for example, had been objectively analyzed in the light of the factors suggested during the latter period of its first phase, a rough "expectation of survival and growth" might have looked something like Figure I.

Had an impartial analyst applied such criteria to Vietnam six to eight months before the final debacle, he might have produced a chart somewhat like Figure II.

Here Determinants A, B, H, and I definitely favored the guerrillas, who also (unlike Castro) had an available sanctuary. Two others, C and F, might have been considered in balance. Although the Vietminh had demonstrated superior tactical ability in guerrilla situations, an experienced observer might have been justified in considering "military efficiency" equal; the French were learning.

While other determinants may no doubt be adduced, those used are, I believe, valid so far as they go, and the box scores indicative. These show that Castro's chances of success might have been estimated as approximately three to two, Ho Chi Minh's as approximately four to three.

These analyses may be criticized as having been formulated after the event; it is, however, my belief that the outcome in Cuba and Indochina could have been pre-