Page:Olcott v. Delaware Flood Co.pdf/15

 legal claims. But the set-off hearing was not a trial on the merits of these claims. Instead the district court held the hearing following its entry of default for Defendants' willful discovery violations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). Defendants do not have a constitutional right to a jury trial following entry of default. , 982 F.2d 686, 692 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Following the entry of default under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2), a party does not have a right to a jury trial under either Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) or the Seventh Amendment.") (quoting, 913 F.2d 1406, 1414 (9th Cir.1990)); , 975 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1992) ("in a default case neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has a constitutional right to a jury trial on the issue of damages"); , 913 F.2d at 1414 (citing , 490 F.2d 315, 318 (9th Cir. 1974)., 24 Fed. Appx. 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the district court did not err in conducting the set-off hearing without a jury.

IV.

Defendants also raise two merit-based challenges to the district court's final default judgment order. "Decisions to enter judgment by default are committed to the district court's sound discretion, and our review is for an abuse of discretion." , 115 F.3d 767, 771 (10th Cir. 1997). We will not disturb the court's decision without a clear showing that the decision was based on a clearly erroneous factual finding or that it manifests a clear error of judgment. See Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046, 1048 (10th Cir. 1995). -15-