Page:Ohio Adjutant General's Department v. FLRA.pdf/9

6 agency,” with exceptions not relevant here. §7103(a)(3). Then, the term “ ‘Executive agency,’ ” as used in Title 5, “means an Executive department, a Government corporation, and an independent establishment.” §105. And each of those terms is separately defined: an “Executive departmen[t]” means each of 15 Cabinet-level Departments, including “[t]he Department of Defense,” §101; a “ ‘Government corporation’ means a corporation owned or controlled by the Government of the United States,” §103; and an “ ‘independent establishment’ means” “an establishment in the executive branch,” with exceptions not relevant here, “which is not an Executive department, military department, Government corporation, or part thereof, or part of an independent establishment,” §104(1). It is undisputed that the Guard is neither a “Government corporation” nor an “independent establishment,” leaving only “Executive department” at issue.

Petitioners work backwards through the links in the statutory chain. They argue that they are not an Executive department because they are not listed among the 15 Cabinet-level Departments specified in §101. Thus, they claim, they are not an “Executive agency” under §105 and, accordingly, do not qualify as an “agency” under the Statute. Respondents counter that the components, representatives, and agents of an agency may be required to comply with the Statute. And they emphasize that petitioners exercise federal authority in employing dual-status technicians and must therefore comply with applicable federal law. Respondents have the better of the argument.

The Guard, when employing dual-status technicians, functions as an agency covered by the Statute. The Statute defines “ ‘agency’ ” to include the Department of Defense, one of the enumerated executive Departments in §101. §7103(a)(3); see §§101 and 105. And, each dual-status