Page:Ohio Adjutant General's Department v. FLRA.pdf/19

Rh Congress wants the FLRA to have authority to enter an order against any of the petitioners, it must give the FLRA that authority. See American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 112–113 (1946) (contemplating that an agency’s remedy may be set aside where it “is unwarranted in law”).

Second, the Court reasons that petitioners, in supervising the technicians, “exercise the authority of the Department of Defense, a covered agency.” The Court approvingly relates respondents’ argument that, while petitioners may not be agencies, “the components, representatives, and agents of an agency may be required to comply with the Statute.”  The Court does not specify which of these three categories it thinks petitioners fall into. It says only that petitioners are “like components of an agency.” (emphasis added). And it finds that they are “like” components of an agency because they supervise the technicians pursuant to a “designat[ion]” from the heads of the Departments of the Army and the Air Force, which are themselves components of the Department of Defense. Since the Department of Defense is an agency, the Court reasons that the same must be true of petitioners.

The problem with this reasoning is that a “designat[ion]” to exercise the authority of an “agency” does not turn the designee into an agency. Just because A is designated to exercise the authority of B, it does not follow that A is B. Here is an example. If an administrative hearing officer in