Page:Ohio Adjutant General's Department v. FLRA.pdf/13

10 Federal government” under the Technicians Act. Id., at 6. The Assistant Secretary then concluded that the adjutant general had “been designated as an agent of the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force” in employing and administering dual-status technicians and that this agency relationship created the obligation to comply with Executive Order No. 11491. Id., at 7.

The definitions of “employee” and “agency” that Thompson Field examined under Executive Order No. 11491 were materially identical to those that Congress ultimately adopted in the FSLMRS. Compare 5 U. S. C. §§§ [sic]7103(a)(2)–(3) (defining “ ‘employee’ ” as “an individual … employed in an agency,” and defining “ ‘agency’ ” as “an Executive agency,” which §105 in turn defines as an executive department, a Government corporation, and an independent establishment) with Exec. Order No. 11491, §§§ [sic]2(a)–(b) (defining “ ‘[e]mployee’ ” primarily as “an employee of an agency,” and defining “ ‘[a]gency’ ” as “an executive department, a Government corporation, and an independent establishment”). We would, therefore, ordinarily presume that the FSLMRS maintained the same coverage that existed under the prior regime. See, e.g., George v. McDonough, 596 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 5); Taggart v. Lorenzen, 587 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (slip op., at 5–6). We see nothing to weaken the force of that presumption here. On the contrary, §7135(b) specifically demonstrates Congress’ intent to leave the prior regime in place except where it was specifically altered. And, because the President has not revoked it and neither the FSLMRS nor associated regulations have repudiated it, the decision in Thompson Field “remain[s] in full force and effect.” §7135(b).

We conclude that petitioners are subject to the authority of the FLRA when acting in their capacities as supervisors of dual-status technicians. Each dual-status technician is