Page:Of the Principle and Duties of Natural Religion, 6th ed., 1710.djvu/24

4 That kind of Evidence may be said to arise from the Nature of Things, when there is such a Congruity or Incongruity betwixt the Terms of a Proposition, or the Deductions of one Proposition from another, as doth either satisfy the Mind, or else leave it in doubt and hesitation about them.

That kind of Evidence is said to arise from Testimony, when we depend upon the Credit and Relation of others for the Truth or Falshood of any Thing. There being several Things which we cannot other wise know, but as others do inform us of them. As namely Matters of Fact, together with the Account of Persons and Places at a Distance. Which kind of Evidence will be more or less clear, according to the Authority and Credit of the Witness.

Besides these, there is mixed kind of Evidence relating both to the Senses and Understanding, depending upon our own Observation and repeated Trials of the Issues and Events of Actions or Things, called Experience.

These are the several kinds of Evidence whereby we attain to the Knowledge or Belief of Things.

The Kinds of Assent proceeding from them, are reducible to these Two Heads.

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