Page:Observations on Man 1834.djvu/272

 then, as this vigour abates, it ought to suggest to us a length of time elapsed; and vice versâ, if it be kept up, the distance of time ought to appear contracted. Now this last is the case: for the death of a friend, or any interesting event, often recollected and related, appears to have happened but yesterday, as we term it, viz. on account of the vividness of the clusters, and their associations, corresponding to the nature of a recent event.—Fourthly, It is not, however, to be here supposed, that we have not many other ways of distinguishing real recollections from mere reveries. For the first are supported by their connexion with known and allowed facts, by various methods of reasoning, and having been related as real recollections, &c.

Fifthly, In like manner we distinguish a new place, book, person, &c. from one which we remember, supposing both to be presented in like circumstances. The parts, associates, &c. of that which we remember, strike us more strongly, are suggested by each other, and hang together, which does not hold of the new. The old does also suggest many associates, which a new one in like circumstances would not. And if from the then state of fancy, the distance of time, &c. there be any doubt of these things either with respect to the old or new, a like doubt arises in respect of the memory. An attentive person may observe, that he determines of such things, whether they be old or new, by the vividness of the ideas, and their power of suggesting each other, and foreign associates.

Some persons seem to suppose, that the soul surveys one object, the old for instance, and comparing it with the impressions which a similar new one would excite, calls the old one an object remembered. But this is like supposing an eye within the eye to view the pictures made by objects upon the retina. Not to mention, that the soul cannot in the same instant, during the same τό νυν survey both the old and new, and compare them together; nor is there any evidence, that this is done in fact. A person who inquires into the nature of memory, may indeed endeavour to state the difference between the impressions of old and new, as I have done here; but this is a speculation that few persons concern themselves with, whereas all remember and apply the words relative to memory just as they do other words. We may conclude therefore, that the difference of vividness and connexion in the ideas, with the other associates of recollections, are a sufficient foundation for the proper use of the words relative to the memory, just as in other like cases.

Sixthly, The peculiar imperfection of the memory in children tallies with the foregoing account of this faculty; and indeed this account may be considered as a gross general history of the successive growth of the memory, in passing from childhood to adult age. Children must learn by degrees the ideas of single impressions, the clusters which I call rudiments, and the most usual connexions and combinations of these. They have also