Page:Observations On The Collapse Of The Hitler Regime In Germany And The Weak Points Of The Stalin Regime In The Soviet Union.pdf/6

 cooperation of many valuable Soviet scientists and lost many possibilities to enrich Soviet scientific research. It goes without saying that such tendencies will weaken the Soviet Union in the long run.

3. Up to now, Stalin's personality has had a mitigating influence on Soviet policy. His outstanding characteristic is his extraordinary flexibility, which has enabled him to adapt his actions to the exigencies of any given political moment. His undisputed authority has allowed him to take a course entirely opposite from one previously pursued whenever political considerations so demanded. His will could be traced into the smallest ramifications of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Decisions were taken either by him personally or upon his consent or, at least, after it had been ascertained that he had no objections whatsoever against them. Nowadays, there are indications that Stalin's activity and personal influence are in decline. When he showed reserve in former definite cases, then everybody knew that he did so in order not to commit himself prematurely. But at present it seems that in various cases his reserve does not rest upon tactical considerations only but on a decrease of his determination, probably because of his advanced age and the ever growing influence of the MGB (Secret Police). This assumption is principally based on the latent state in which the Tito conflict and the Berlin issue are being maintained by the Soviet Union.

4. Whether Stalin's relative passiveness has allowed an increase in the influence of other members of the Politbureau at the cost of his awn can not yet be judged with absolute certainty. Opinions which circulate in the world on this subject are contradictory and not convincing. Nevertheless, it can be taken as certain that among the members of the Politbureau there are those who consider peaceful understanding with the Western Powers both necessary and possible and others who loathe every dealing with the outer world and urge an armed showdown. Mikoyan and Kaganovioh certainly belong to the first group, whereas Party politicians like Malenkov and his adherents in the Organization Bureau and in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party seem to represent the second one. It seems that Stalin himself has not yet made up his mind whether he should approve the one or the other line. Therefore, his most faithful henchman Molotov maintains a wait-and-see position too.

However, there is no doubt that Stalin is fully aware of the fact that a war of the non-Communist world against the Soviet Union would be an immediate danger to the U. S. S. R. The prudence and statesmanship displayed by Stalin up to now do not support the opinion that Stalin might be induced to take a step which could unleash a general war. Stalin is especially aware of the fact that in the event of war he cannot count upon the full support of the Soviet population. His experiences in this regard during the war with Germany are still fresh in his memory.