Page:Observations On The Collapse Of The Hitler Regime In Germany And The Weak Points Of The Stalin Regime In The Soviet Union.pdf/4

 the Nazi regime could not have overcome these problems. Fully aware of this fact, Hitler purposely unleashed the war after he realized that the methods of political pressure, intimidation and bluff which he had used hitherto would not get him anywhere.

Be that as it may, the problem of the present moment is whether another totalitarian regime, which is embodied in Stalin and which now threatens the world's peace and security by its material and ideological aspirations, shows traits similar to those which caused the collapse of the Hitler regime, and whether, therefore, the prospect exists that the Stalin regime will finally succumb to its own deficiencies.

B..

The one-party system represents the common characteristic of the Nazi regime in Germany and the Bolshevik regime in the Soviet Union. In both cases the one-party system led to dictatorship of one single personality. Yet, the way in which such a development came about was fundamentally different in each country. The so-called (principle of single leader) was always an integral part of the program of the NSDAP (National Socialist Party), whereas that principle is contradictory to Communist doctrine, according to which, not a personality, but the collectivity is competent to rule Party and state. Therefore, the seizure of absolute power by Stalin after Lenin's death was an arbitrary sot and a violation of the Communist Party's statute. Stalin's power rests exclusively upon his awn strong personality. After he came into power he suppressed every trace of opposition and exterminated even his closest friends and co-workers whenever he felt the slightest danger from them for his personal position. The Soviet Union's present strength rests, in a great measure, on Stalin's dictatorial manner of ruling which, in case of his death, will be the source of her future weakness. For, there is nobody in the Soviet Union who enjoys an authority which would enable him to take possession of Stalin's heritage at once. Therefore, it must be assumed as certain that after Stalin's death his competencies will be distributed among the most prominent members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U. S. S. R. but that soon afterwards a severe struggle, similar to that which once occuredoccurred [sic] between Stalin and Trotsky, will break out among his principal successors. It cannot be doubted that some of his successors will try to gain the dominating position in the Party and in the state. Furthermore, it must be expected that the rank and file of Party members will participate in that struggle in order to prevent anyone's succeeding in seizing dictatorial power. Such a struggle will not only deeply shake the whole structure of the Party but also weaken the internal and external position of the Soviet Union as a state. It is difficult to forecast now what should be done from outside in such a case in order to guide further developments in favor of the interests of the non-Communist world. Future policy will depend entirely on actual circumstances which prevail at a given moment.