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 476 were in the park; they were lying just above the great cascade; they were about everywhere in that direction. He started up, and looked about for men. He had not many to spare, for each man under his command was called upon to do the work of two or three. There were some Genoese carabineers, there were a couple of hundred men of the Brigade Spanzare. He could pick up some troops as he marched upon Caserta; he would find some there. The order was given to stand ready for two —sharp.

The Royalists, as it has been said, had gained possession of a part of Caserta early in the morning. Surprised and delighted at this new success, they had dispersed themselves through the town partly to look out for the two wary-headed old Hungarian generals—partly to plunder. While they were so engaged, Garibaldi came upon them, and in a very short time they were driven into the open, and back into the arms of Bixio at Maddaloni, or otherwise accounted for. General Saulis, with a brigade, now appeared upon the scene. Garibaldi in person led them on up the hills, and straight to Caserta Vecchia, where the survivors of the column which had threatened Maddaloni the day before, now attempted to make a last stand. Four or five hundred prisoners were taken on the spot, and then a coursing match began. Two battalions ran straight into the centre of General Saulis’ position, and were made prisoners in a body. They were chased up hill and down hill—a novel form of field sport in those grounds sacred to the Diana of the Bourbons. Some were caught about the cascades—many in the park—but the upshot was that before evening closed in, about 2500 officers and men were brought into the court-yards of the palace, and found accommodation for the night in the former residence of their Royal Master. It is calculated that this column is entirely accounted for, and that with some insignificant exceptions it is wholly lost to the King. About 3000 were made prisoners on the previous day in the affair at this point.

About 1500 were killed or wounded, and nine guns were taken. It is no exaggeration to say that the battle of the Volturno, with its consequences, must have cost Francis II. the loss of 10,000 fighting men, the great bulk of whom are prisoners-of-war. The Royalists seem to have been convinced by this trial, that any further attempt against the Patriots in front is not to be thought of. From more recent intelligence we hear that the movements of the royal generals seem to give indication of an intention to give up Capua altogether. They are moving men, provisions, and munitions of war out of Capua, and directing them upon Gaeta. Capua, very probably, by the time this number of is published will be in the hands of Garibaldi and his followers, or of the Sardinians. Nothing, however, has been more remarkable about Garibaldi’s system of tactics since he first landed in Sicily than his apparent appreciation of the value of the instruments at his disposal. He never attacked the citadel of Messina; he has not given evidence of any intention to commence regular siege operations against Capua. Like a good workman he puts each tool to its right use. He neither attempts to plane planks with a saw, nor to saw them with a plane. Had he attempted any thing like a regular siege, the enthusiasm of his followers would soon have grown cold. It requires the fortitude and fidelity of disciplined soldiers to lie for weeks and months in trenches exposed to privations, to the inclemency of the weather, and to the enduring fire of the foe. In such a position troops know their own losses but too well—they cannot see the damage which they inflict upon the enemy. The three great fortresses of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, namely, Messina, Capua, and Gaeta, will, in all probability, be surrendered, if not without a blow, at least without the tedium and danger of a regular siege. In a few days Francis II. will.be called upon to make his choice between casting in his lot with the defenders à l’outrance of Gaeta, or making his escape by sea, whilst the sea is still open. The King once gone, the fortress will soon be surrendered.

Meanwhile events are thickening in the Italian peninsula. At the latter end of last week a report was about in London that the Austrians were making fresh preparations for crossing the Mincio, and staking the fortunes of the Empire once more upon the hazard of the game of war. Louis Napoleon has despatched large reinforcements to Rome, and to the patrimony of St. Peter. The presence of the French troops in such force is a fact from which we must draw our own inferences, for little faith can be given to the assertions of any of the parties concerned. If we attempt to form our judgment on the future from the past, the probability would seem to be, that the French Emperor is well disposed to assist Victor Emmanuel to the crown of Italy, but upon the condition that he will make a fresh cession of territory to France.

It is hinted that the price to be paid this time is the Island of Sardinia. If this be given up, and if the Great Powers of Europe did not interfere to put an end to such a bargain and sale of an island so important from its geographical position, it is likely enough that the French would hold the Austrians in check, whilst Victor Emmanuel was consolidating his power throughout the Peninsula. If this be not done, and the resistance will more probably come from the Great Powers, than either from Count Cavour or his master, it is hard indeed to venture a suggestion at the course which will be taken by the silent man, whose decisions are now of such enormous importance to the world. One of the leading points of his policy, has ever been to establish French supremacy in the Mediterranean; and he would no doubt look with great jealousy on the establishment and consolidation of a power, which would soon take rank amongst the great maritime powers of Europe, and which might not always be the obedient satellite of France.

On the whole, it may be asserted, without much fear of error, either that Louis Napoleon will have his price, or that he will not give a hearty and honest support to the consolidation of the Italian kingdom. There is one man who has never ceased to express his distrust of Louis Napoleon on this point, and his name is Joseph Garibaldi.