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 474 strength. It is so strong that it has held out when resistance was overcome at every other point, and so has been surrendered as the prize of conquest into the victor’s hand, because it was idle to prolong the defence of a fortress against the force of a kingdom. Another incident of the like kind seems imminent at Gaeta just now.

The Royalists thus were in occupation of this district of the Two Fortresses (the quadrilateral, as it were, of Naples); they were masters of the whole course of the river, and had erected most formidable works upon its right bank. This is described as bristling with guns well masked. The bridges at Capua were their own, so that they could advance or retreat at their own pleasure from or back upon a position so strong by nature and so carefully fortified by art. In their rear ran the Garigliano, which could be used as a second line of defence if they were driven from the first. It was on the banks of this stream that Gonsalvo da Cordova fought his great battle, now well-nigh four centuries ago; and here it was that Bayard held a bridge, single-handed, against a mass of Spanish cavalry. It was in the swamps of the Garigliano—close by Minturnæ—that Marius hid himself in the rushes from the pursuit of Sylla’s followers. In the year of grace 1860, it might have been used as a second rampart by the last of the Neapolitan Bourbons against his people—and the position is a strong one. Unfortunately there was a little difficulty in the way. Lamoricière and his levies had been utterly crushed before Ancona. General Cialdini, at the head of the triumphant Sardinians, was advancing steadily, and southerly,—and in a few days would be on the left bank of the Garigliano. With Cialdini there, and Garibaldi on the hills on the right bank of the Volturno, in another week Francis II. would have been in a mere trap. He could not hope to make front against both enemies; and, no matter which one he attacked, the other would fall upon his defenceless rear. But the Sardinians had not yet hemmed him in. Naples was his own, if he could win the day against Garibaldi and his followers. On one side was a good chance of recovering a throne—on the other a certainty of shame and destruction.

Now the position of the Garibaldians was this,—but the map must be consulted by any one who would arrive at a clear idea of the situation. The left-wing rested upon Aversa, occupying the ground from Santa Maria to that town. The right-wing rested upon San Salvatore, stretching from Dentici to that spot. The head-quarters were at Caserta. The key of the position was Monte San Angelo. The Garibaldians occupied an irregular semi-circle. A line drawn through Santa Maria, Caserta, and Maddaloni, would have been the chord of that arc, as the positions were rectified upon the eve of the engagement. The defect of the position was that the left-flank by Santa Maria was somewhat exposed. The semicircle extends over about thirty miles of hill, along which the Garibaldians were posted, before they were concentrated for action at the points chiefly threatened. At about six on the first of October the king moved out from Capua. He had with him 16,000 men, of whom 5000 were cavalry under the command of General Palmieri, with five batteries commanded by General Nigri. General Ritucci was the Commander-in-Chief, and with him was the young king in plain clothes. At the same time a detachment 5000 strong was directed upon Maddaloni with the view of cutting off the retreat of the Garibaldians. This manœuvre at the outset of an engagement seems to be erroneous when Garibaldi is the leader on the other side. The Neapolitan troops had been collected in an open space before the fortress, and when they moved out they divided into two columns; the one moved from Capua upon Saint Angelo, the other, the right column, upon Santa Maria. The advance of the left column seems to have been conducted with the same caution and the same success as the advance of the Russian troops upon the British position at Inkermann. The mist was lying heavily upon the low land. The Neapolitans took every advantage of the broken ground, and surprised the defenders of a large barricade which had been erected to guard the position. This was carried, and the column opened out, and formed into line of battle in the open behind it. The other column was equally successful. The Garibaldians had been taken by surprise, but at the critical moment the great leader himself appeared upon the scene. Skirmishers were thrown out, some guns were brought into action, repeated bayonet charges were delivered, and after three or four hours hard fighting, the Neapolitans were driven from the position they had taken, and possession of the barricade was recovered.

Meanwhile, on the left of the patriots at Santa Maria, where General Milvitz commanded, precisely similar events had occurred. There had been a surprise, a rally, three or four hours fighting, at the end of which the Neapolitans were driven back. The battle here was exceeding hot; because Santa Maria is close to Capua, where the Neapolitan reserves lay. They kept on bringing up fresh troops, and again fresh troops, until the strength, if not the courage of the brave defenders of Santa Maria was well-nigh exhausted. Message after message was sent asking for reinforcements. None could be given, the little reserve was wanted elsewhere. The detachment of which mention has already been made had attacked General Bixio at Maddaloni. They were 5000 strong, concentrated for action. He had with him 2000, or 2500 men scattered over the hills which he must defend at all hazards. By noon, the Neapolitans at this point were driven back to the river; many threw themselves into the mountains between Caserta and Maddaloni.

But now the moment had arrived when Gabaldi’s defence was to be converted into an attack. Two brigades which had been much weakened, however, by detachments, had been held in reserve. They were marched up to the front—one of them was forwarded by rail—so here was an instance of the application of modern science to the fearful exigencies of a battle-field. The Piedmontese gunners, and the little body of Hungarian cavalry did their duty well by Santa Maria, and after some time, when General Türr had reached the ground with his infantry, the Neapolitans