Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/98

 of what is multifariously predicated. On the other hand, we confirm it, if neither any one of the names, nor the whole sentence signify many things; for in this respect the property will be well laid down, thus since neither body denotes many things, nor that which is most easily moved to an upward place, nor the whole composed of these, according to this, a body which is most easily moved to an upward place would be well assigned as the property of fire.

In the next place, we subvert it if that is multifariously predicated, of which they assign the property, yet it is not defined, of which of them the property is laid down, for the property (thus), will not be well assigned. On account of what reason is not obscure from what has been before said, for the same things must necessarily result, for instance, since to know this thing scientifically, signifies many things, (viz. that this possesses science and that it uses science, and that there is a science of it, and that we use the science of it,) the property of scientifically knowing this thing, would not be well assigned when it is not defined, of which of them, the property is laid down. We confirm it, however, if that of which the property is placed, be not multifariously predicated, but is one and simple, for as to this, the property will be well laid down, for instance, since man is predicated as one thing, it would be well laid down as to this, that the property of man (consisted in his being) an animal naturally mild.

Again, we subvert it, if the same thing has frequently been mentioned in the property, for oftentimes it escapes notice when men do this, as well in properties as in definitions. Now the property of this kind will not be well laid down, for the frequent repetition disturbs the hearer, so that obscurity necessarily arises, and besides this men seem loquacious. Still it will happen that the same thing is frequently repeated in two modes, the one, when we often denominate the same, as if any one assigned the property of fire to be a body the most subtle of all bodies, (for he repeats the word body,) and in the second place, if a man assumes definitions instead of names, as if he should give as the property of earth, that it was an essence which, most of all bodies, naturally tends to a downward place, and should afterwards assume, instead of (the word) bodies, such