Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/89

 vehement, likewise also there is an exceeding astonishment, if then astonishment is excess, excess would be exceeding. Nevertheless, neither of these seems right, as neither is science the object of science, nor motion that which is moved.

Sometimes, indeed, an error arises from placing passion in that which suffers, as a genus, which happens to as many as declare immortality to be perpetual life; for immortality appears to be a certain passion or symptom of life, and that what we have stated is true, may become evident, if any one admits that a person from being mortal has become immortal, for no one would say that he takes another life, but that a certain symptom or passion accedes to this life, wherefore life is not the genus of immortality.

Again, (an error occurs) if that of which there is passion, they declare to be the genus of the passion, as that wind is air in motion, for wind is rather the motion of air, since the same air remains both when it is moved and when it is stationary, so that, in short, wind is not air, for else there would be wind when the air is not moved, since the same air remains stationary which was wind. The like will also happen in other such things, if then it is necessary in this to grant that wind is air in motion, yet such a thing is not to be admitted in all cases, (i.e.) of which the proposed genus is not truly predicated, but in those only wherein it is truly predicated. For in some it does not appear truly predicated, as in clay and snow, for they describe snow to be congealed water; but clay, earth, mingled with moisture; yet neither is snow, water; nor clay, earth; so that neither of the assigned can be genus, for genus must of necessity always be