Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/86

 a power as this is consequent to each, so that if he suffers, he should not be transported by, but command (passion). Yet this is not the essence of a courageous or a mild man, but not to be affected at all, by such things.

Sometimes, indeed, they admit as genus, that which is in any way consequent, as that pain is the genus of anger, and opinion of faith, for both these we have named follow in a certain way the assigned species, yet neither of them is a genus, for the angry man is pained, pain having been produced in him before, since the anger is not the cause of the pain, but the pain of the anger, so that anger simply is not pain. On this account, neither is faith opinion, since it is possible to have an opinion of, without believing in, a thing; and this is impossible, if faith is a species of opinion, for it is impossible that a thing should remain the same any longer, if it has been altogether changed from species, as neither can the same animal by possibility be sometimes man, but sometimes not. Still, if any one say, that he who opines, of necessity also believes, opinion and faith will be predicated of an equality, so that neither thus can it be genus, since it is necessary that genus possess a greater extent of predication.

Observe, moreover, whether both are naturally adapted to be in any the same thing, for in what the species is, the genus also is, as in what there is whiteness, there is also colour, and in what grammar is present, science also is. If then, any one should say that shame is fear, or that anger is pain, species and genus will not happen to be in the same thing, since shame is in the reasoning, but fear in the irascible part of the soul; pain also, indeed, is in the appetitive part, (for pleasure also is in this,) but anger in the irascible part, so that what have been assigned are not genera,