Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/73

 Again, whether what is placed in the genus can possibly partake of no species, since it is impossible that what partakes of no species, should partake of genus, unless it should be one of those species according to the first division, for these alone partake of genus. If, then, motion be assumed as the genus of pleasure, we must see whether pleasure be not production, nor alteration, nor any one of the other assigned motions, for it is palpable, that it partakes of no species, wherefore neither of the genus, since it is necessary that the participant of the genus, should also be participant of some species, so that pleasure can neither be a species of motion, nor an individual, (neither among those which are under a species of motion). For individuals partake, also, of genus and species, as a certain man, participates both of man, and of animal.

Besides, whether what is placed in genus, is of wider extension than the genus, as the subject of opinion, than entity, since both entity, and non-entity, are objects of opinion, wherefore, the object of opinion, will not be a species of entity, as the genus is always more widely extended than the species. Again, whether the species and the genus are predicated of an equal number of things, as if amongst those which are consequent to all, one should be placed as species, but the other as genus, as "being," and "the one;" for "being," and "the one," (are consequent) to every thing, so that neither is the genus of the other, since they are predicated of an equal number. Likewise also, if the first and the principal, be placed, one upon the other, since the principal is what is first, and what is first is principal, so that either both stated are the same, or neither is the genus of the other. Still the element relative to all such is,