Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/64

 that which has it in a greater degree. Further, if one thing causes that to be good with which it is present, but another does not, the efficient is preferable, as what heats is hotter than what does not, yet if both cause it, that which causes it the more, or that which renders the better and more principal thing good, as if one thing causes the soul, but another the body.

Again, from cases, uses, actions, and works, and these from those, for they follow each other; for example, if justly is preferable to courageously, justice also is preferable to courage, and if justice is preferable to courage, justly also is preferable to courageously, and similarly in other things.

Besides, if of the same thing one is the greater good, but the other the less, the greater is preferable, or if it is the good of the greater, it is the greater (good). But also if two things are preferable to a certain thing, the more eligible is to be preferred to the less eligible. Again, that of which the excess is more eligible than the excess (of another thing), is itself more eligible, as friendship than wealth, for the excess of friendship is preferable to the excess of wealth. Also that which a man would rather procure through himself, than which (he procures) through another, e.g. friends than money.

Again, also from addition, if any thing being added to the same, renders the whole more eligible: we must be careful, however, lest we propose such things, in which what is common is employed in one of the things added, or is in some other way co-operative with it, but the rest is not used nor is co-operative; for example, a saw and a sickle (being joined) by constructive art, the saw when conjoined is more eligible, but