Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/47

 Since, however, some things are from necessity, others subsist generally, but others casually, if what is from necessity is laid down as general, or what is general as from necessity, either itself, or the contrary to what subsists generally, it always affords a place for argument. For if what is of necessity be laid down as for the most part, it is evident that a person states it to be present, not with every individual, when it is, so that he commits an error; also, if he says, that what is for the most part is from necessity, since he states that to be present with every individual which is not; similarly, if he says that the contrary to the general is from necessity, for the contrary to the general is always asserted of the fewer, for instance, if men are generally bad, good men are few, so that he makes a still greater error if he says that men are of necessity good. Likewise, if he should say that what happens casually, is from necessity, or for the most part, for the casual, is neither necessary, nor general; if, however, a person has not defined, whether he says a thing is general, or of necessity, but the thing should subsist as for the most part, it is possible to dispute, as if he had said, it was of necessity, e. g. if he had said, that those without heritage were bad, without defining them (who they are), it might be argued as if he had said (they were so), from necessity.

Moreover, we must consider whether he has placed a thing accidental, as if different, to itself, from the name being different, as Prodicus divided pleasures into joy, delight, and hilarity, for all these are names of the same thing, pleasure; if then any one should say that joy happens to hilarity, he would say that the same thing happens to itself.