Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/39

 possibly be injured, since it is impossible that God can be hurt. Again, if the worthy man is envious, who is the envious, and what is envy, (must be considered,) for if envy be pain at the apparent success of some worthy person, it is evident that a worthy man is not envious, for if so, he would be depraved, and if the man prone to indignation be envious, (we must explain) who each of these is, for thus it will be evident whether what is said is true or false, e. g. if he is envious who is grieved at the success of the good, but he is prone to indignation who is grieved at the success of the bad, it is clear that the envious will not be the indignant man. We must also assume definitions, instead of the names in definitions, and not desist until we arrive at what is known; since often the question is not yet clear, when, indeed, the whole definition has been given, but it becomes evident, if the definition is given, instead of some name placed in the definition.

Moreover, the problem must be changed into a proposition and then objected to, for the objection will be an argument against the thesis: this place, indeed, is almost the same as seeing, with what, either all or none, a thing is said to be present, but it differs in the mode. Further, we must define what kind of things we ought, and what we ought not, to denominate as the multitude do, for this is useful both for confirmation and subversion, as that things are to be called by the same names as the multitude use, but that we are no longer to attend to the multitude, as to the quality of things, whether they be such or such. For instance, that is to be called salubrious, which is productive of health, as the multitude say, but whether the thing proposed be productive of health or not, is no longer to be decided by what the multitude, but by what the physician declares.