Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/279

 CHAP IX.] sides, neither can species become most generic, nor genus most specific.

to genus and to property it is common to follow species, for if any thing be man, it is animal, and if any thing be man. it is risible. Likewise to genus, to be equally predicated of species, species, and to property, (to be equally predicated) of the individuals winch participate it; thus man and ox are equally animal, and Anytus and Melitus risible. It is also common that genus should be univocally predicated of its proper species, and property of the things cf winch it is the property; still they differ, because genus is prior, but property posterior, for animal must first necessarily exist, afterwards be divided by differences and properties. Also genus indeed is predicated of many species, but property of one certain species of which it is the property. Besides property is reciprocally predicated of that of which it is the property, but genus is not reciprocally predicated of any thing, for neither if any thing is an animal, is it a man, nor if a thing be animal is it risible, but if any thing is a man it is risible, and vice versâ. Moreover, property is inherent in the whole species, of which it is the property, in it alone, and always, but genus in the whole species indeed of which it is the genus, and always, yet not in it alone; once more, properties being subverted do not co-subvert genera, but genera being subverted, co-subvert species, to which properties belong; wherefore, also those things of which there are properties, being subverted, the properties themselves also, are co-subverted.