Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/249

 beginning, we must not acknowledge as if it were impossible for the same thing to be double and not double, but we must state that it is not possible so as that an elenchus be acknowledged to be made. All these arguments however are from such a place as this: Does he who knows each particular that it is each particular, know the thing? and the ignorant person in like manner? But some one knowing Coriscus that he is Coriscus, may be ignorant that he is a musician, so that he knows and is ignorant of the same thing. Also, is the size of four cubits greater than that of three cubits? But a size of four cubits in length may be made out of three cubits, and the greater is greater than the less, wherefore the same thing is greater and less than itself.

Chapter 27
from begging the (original question) and assuming it if it is manifest, must not be granted to the inquirer, not even if it be probable that he speaks the truth; but if it be latent, ignorance, from the fault of such arguments as these, must be retorted on the questionist, as not disputing (well), for an elenchus is without that (which was interrogated) from the beginning. Next, that he granted not that he (the opponent) should use it, but as being about syllogistically to prove the contrary, as in parexelenchi.

Chapter 28
also which prove from the consequent we must show from the argument itself. Now