Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/245

 it is evident that if the elenchus appears to be assumed from the multifarious, it is necessary that the name or the sentence should properly be of many, but that this person is the son of this man, no one asserts properly, if he is the master of a son, but the composition is from accident. Is this yours? yes! but this is a son, therefore this is your son, because it happens to be both yours and a son, yet not your son.

Also (the solution of the deception by which it is concluded), that something amongst evils is good, since prudence is the science of things evil, for to be of the number of these, (they say) is not predicated multifariously, but (as) possession, or if it should be multifariously, (for we say that man is of the number of animals, yet not their possession, and if any thing is referred to evils, as to be said to be of a certain thing, is it on this account of evils, yet this is not to be of the number of evils;) it seems then (to be assumed) from, "in a certain respect" and "simply." Perhaps, however, it is possible that something good may be of evils in a two-fold respect, yet not in this argument, but rather (in that), "Can there be a good servant of a bad (master)?" But perhaps neither thus, for it does not follow if he is good and pertains to this man, that he is the good of this man at the same time, nor when we say that man is of animals, is this predicated multifariously, since neither when we signify any thing, by removal, is this predicated multifariously, for when we say the half of a verse, we signify, Give me the Iliad, as, for instance, (Give me,) "Sing, Goddess, the anger."