Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/235

 sentence are two-fold, we must answer thus, that it partly is, and partly is not, as that the silent speaks is partly true, and partly not. And that should be done, is true of some things, but not of others, for  are predicated multifariously. Still if it be latent, at the end we must correct the interrogation by an addition; "Is it then true, ?" "No, but ." In those, also, which have the multifarious in the propositions, (we must act) in like manner; "Do they not at the same time then, know what they know?" Yes, but not those who thus know, for it is not the same thing that (those who know), at one and the same time know, and that those who thus know, cannot (at one and the same time know). In short, (the respondent) must contend even if the adversary simply concludes, and (he must assert) that he denied not the thing affirmed by him, but the name, so that it is not an elenchus.

Chapter 20
is evident how these arguments which are from division and composition must be solved, for if a divided and a composite sentence have a different signification, that must be stated which is contrary to the conclusion. Now all such arguments are from composition or division. "Did he strike him with that,