Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/214

 is in syllogism, and that (which errs) in neither, is a true syllogism.

But (to return), whence the discussion digressed, do mathematical arguments pertain to the reason or not? and if a triangle seems to some one to signify many things, and he grants (not so far as it is figure, of which this is concluded) that it has angles equal to two right, does this discussion belong to the reasoning faculty of his mind or not?

Again, if a name signifies many things, but he does not understand, nor fancy (that it does), how does this disputation not pertain to the reason? or how must we interrogate, unless by granting a distinction, whether any one may inquire if it is possible for him who is silent to speak or not, or whether it partly is not, and partly is, possible? If then, some one should grant that it is by no means possible, but another should contend that it is, will not the disputation be against the reasoning faculty? though the dispute seems to belong to those which are from name; there is not then a certain genus of arguments, which belong to the reason. Nevertheless, some pertain to name, yet not all are such, not (I say) those which are elenchi, but not the apparent elenchi, for there are apparent elenchi, which are not from diction, for instance, those which are from accident, and others.

Notwithstanding, if some one thinks fit to claim a division, I mean that the silent speaks, partly in this and partly in that manner; yet to demand this, is, in the first place, absurd, (for sometimes what is interrogated does not seem to subsist multifariously, and it is impossible to divide that which a man does not conceive). Next, what else will to