Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/210

 Now that we obtain these by the same method is evident, for from those things, through which it appears to the hearers, that the subjects of investigation are syllogistically concluded, from these they may appear also to the respondent, so that there will be false syllogisms through either all or some of these, for what a person, not interrogated, thinks he has granted, he will also admit when interrogated, except that in some cases it happens at the same time that what is deficient is questioned, and what is false is detected, as in the paralogisms from diction and solecism. If then, paralogisms of contradiction arise from apparent elenchus, it is clear that false syllogisms will be derived from as many (places) as apparent elenchus. But the apparent is from parts of the true; for when each fails, there may appear an elenchus, as that which is from the conclusion not happening in consequence of the reasoning; that which leads to the impossible; also, that which makes two interrogations, one, from the proposition; and that which assumes what is from accident, instead of what is per se, and a part of this, which is (derived) from what is consequent; besides not to happen in the thing, but in the discussion; then, instead of (assuming) contradiction universally, according to the same, and with reference to the same, and after the same manner, (to assume it) in a certain thing, or according to each of these; further from the original (question), not being reckoned, to assume the original question. Hence, we shall be in possession of those things from which paralogisms occur, since they cannot arise from more, but they will all be from the (places) specified.

A sophistical elenchus, is yet not simply an elenchus, but against some person, and a syllogism likewise, for except it be assumed that what is from the equivocal signifies one thing, and what is from a similar figure of speech, (signifies) this thing only, and the rest in like manner, there will neither be elenchi nor syllogisms, whether simply, or against him who is interrogated, but if this is assumed, there will be, indeed, against him who is interrogated, but simply there will not be, since they do not assume that which signifies one thing, but what appears (to do so) and from this person.