Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/201

 Other (paralogisms arise) from some particular thing being said to be simply this, or in a certain respect, and not properly, when what is predicated in part, is assumed as spoken simply; e.g. if (some one should infer that if) what is not, is the obiect of opinion, what is not, is, for it is not the same thing to be a certain thing, and to be, simply. Or, again, that being is not being, if some one of the number of beings is not, for instance if man is not, for it is not the same for a certain thing not to be, and not to be simply, but there seems from the affinity of diction, to be but a small difference between a certain thing existing and existence, and a certain thing not existing and non-existence. Likewise, also, (paralogisms arise) from (predication) in a certain respect, and simply, thus, if an Indian, being wholly black, has white teeth, he is white and not white, or if both are present in a certain respect, that contraries are present at the same time. Such a case, however, (of paralogism) it is easy for every body to perceive in certain (sentences), for instance, if assuming the Ethiopian to be black, he should ask whether he is white as to his teeth, if then in this respect he is white, it may be thought syllogistically proved, when he has perfected the interrogation, that (the man) is black and not black. In some (sentences), indeed, (the paralogism) is frequently latent, viz. in those, where when an assertion is made in a certain respect, the simply (being asserted) also seems to follow, and in those wherein it is not easy to perceive, whether