Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/195



Chapter 2
disputation, there are four genera of arguments, the didactic, the dialectic, the peirastic (or tentative), and the contentious. The didactic, indeed, are those which syllogize from the proper principles of each discipline, and not from the opinions of him who answers, (for it is necessary that he who learns, should believe:) the dialectic are such as collect contradiction from probabilities:  the peirastic are those which are (conclusive) from things appearing to the respondent, and which are necessary for him to know, who pretends to possess science, (in what manner, indeed, has been defined elsewhere:) the contentious are those which infer, or seem to infer, from the apparently, but not really, probable. Now concerning the demonstrative, we have spoken in the Analytics, but concerning the dialectic and peirastic in other treatises; let us now, therefore, speak about those which are contentious, and litigious.

Chapter 3
must, in the first place, assume how many are the objects which they aim at, who contend, and strive, in disputations, and these are five in number: an elenchus, the false, the paradox, the solecism, and the fifth, to make their opponent in disputation trifle, (this is to compel him frequently to say the same thing,) or what is not, but seems to be, each of these. They specially indeed, prefer, to appear to confute by an elenchus, next to point out some false assertion, thirdly, to lead to a paradox, and fourthly, to make (their adversary) commit a solecism, (and this is, to make the respondent, from the argument, speak barbarously), in the last place, to make (a person) frequently say the same thing.