Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/184

, but which require more labour to demonstrate than the problem.

Notwithstanding, we need not require the syllogisms of all problems to be alike probable and convincing; for some things investigated, are straightway by nature more easy, but others more difficult, so that he will discourse well, who argues from such as are of the greatest possible probability. Wherefore, it is evident then, there is not the same reprehension of an argument, as to what is laid down in the question, and when it is per se, for nothing prevents an argument being per se reprehensible, but commendable as to the problem; and again, vice versâ, praiseworthy per se, but reprehensible as to the problem, when it is more easy to conclude from many things probable and true. For sometimes an argument, even when conclusive, may be worse than what is inconclusive, when the one concludes from foolish things, the problem not being such, but the other requires such as are probable and true, and the argument does not consist in the things assumed. Still, it is not just to reprehend those who conclude the true through the false, for the false must of necessity always be collected through the false, yet sometimes it is possible to collect the true, even through the false, indeed it is evident from the Analytics.

When the before-named argument is a demonstration of something, if there is something else which has nothing to do with the conclusion, there will not be a syllogism about it; but if there should appear (to be one), it will be a sophism, not a demonstration. Now, a philosophema is a demonstrative syllogism; an epicheirema, a dialectic syllogism; but a sophism, a contentious syllogism; and an aporema, a dialectic syllogism of contradiction.